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I: The Questions Raised for Political Science

1. The Attacks and Their Aftermath

On September 11, 2001 the American cities of New York and Washington, D.C. were attacked by so-called "terrorists." In New York the twin towers of the World Trade Center crumbled, causing casualties of thousands of ordinary people.

Since no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks yet, it is not clear at all who carried out the violent attacks and what the purpose was. However, it is unlikely that the destruction itself was the sole aim. It is reasonable to read from the course of events that those who planned the attacks considered it obvious, without their open claim, who they were and what their aims were. They had goals of their own, and violence was utilized as a threat to force the United States Government to accept whatever claims they had.3

Shortly after the attacks the U.S. Government confirmed that it was going after Osama bin Laden who was in command of an international terrorist organization, al Qaeda.4 Bin Laden himself did not acknowledge his involvement in the incident, but endorsed the attacks relating them to termination of the United States' support to Israel and withdrawal of the non-Islamic U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia where Islamic sacred places are located.5

The reaction to the violent acts was swift and dramatic. Most of the countries in the world gathered together under the banner of anti-terrorism, and there emerged a confrontation between the international community, led by the United States, and bin Laden and the Taliban Administration which was sheltering him. And, on October 7, 2001 the United States together with some of its allies launched military operations in Afghanistan with the intention of capturing bin Laden, eradicating the al Qaeda organization and overthrowing the Taliban Administration.

2. The Questions Concerned Grasped the Meaning of the Attacks

Bin Laden grasped the meaning of this situation as a confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims. In accordance with Islam, he endorsed the 9.11 violent attacks
and denied the validity of the military actions taken by the United States and other countries in Afghanistan, thus soliciting support from those countries where many Muslims reside. In opposition to this, President Bush of the United States viewed the situation as urging us to choose between freedom and terrorism. His intention was to strengthen the anti-terrorism unity by locating terrorism in an opposite position to that of freedom.

The confrontation of claims made by the two figures suggests the fact that there exist opposing modes of thinking as regards justification of the use of violence. However, they state only conclusions, and their respective lines of reasoning are not distinct.

Bin Laden does not show how the 9.11 violence is logically justified according to Islam despite the fact that many Islamic countries, too, gathered together under the anti-terrorism banner. Likewise, even though the violent attacks represent a drastically opposing viewpoint, President Bush does not give explanations to the following points, but rather treats them as if they are self-evident: What is the value of freedom? Why does freedom occupy the position opposite to that of terrorism? He also gives no answer to what the logical grounds are on which a distinction between "terrorists' attacks" and military actions against "terrorist organizations" for the purpose of defending the political regime of freedom can be made, despite the fact that there were demonstrations, even in the United States, against the military operations in Afghanistan.

**ii: Explanations by the Third Parties**

As time passed, there appeared in the discussion of the event a new tone which ascribed the cause of the violence to the uneven distribution of wealth in the world; in other words, the contrast between the rich North represented by the United States and poor South including Afghanistan. The United States was criticized for not being considerate of those people suffering from extreme poverty, and this was recognized as effecting the 9.11 violence.

This explanation correctly indicates one of the factors leading to the 9.11 attacks. However, it misses the point.

This explanation assumes a behavior pattern that "one resorts to violent measures when one feels extremely discontented." However, from experience, this statement does not hold true of every possible case. This explanation does not take into consideration the fact that there are those who are determined not to resort to violent measures except, for example, in the case of self-defense. In sum, it fails to indicate the difference between the reasons to invariably resort to violent measures when other means have been exhausted (and it pays) and those not to resort to violent measures under any circumstances except, for example, in the case of self-defense.

The analysis above reached a conclusion that there exist opposing modes of thinking as regards justification of the use of violence.

**iii: The Questions Raised for Political Science**
The 9.11 attacks suggest the following: There are different modes of thinking for justification of the use of violence. They act as the guiding principle for each of the two opposing political groups. The 9.11 acts of violence and the military actions taken in Afghanistan to strike back are a manifestation of the rivalry.

As is already clear, neither bin Laden nor Bush systematically presented their thoughts on the 9.11 attacks and the following military actions in Afghanistan. They have both made important points although the basis of these is yet to be given. In order to fully grasp the meaning of what the attacks suggest, therefore, we need to show two fully developed modes of thinking which bin Laden and Bush may adopt if they reason systematically and without contradictions. In other words, their respective modes of thinking need to be systematically reorganized and be presented as a logically consistent whole.

I propose to use the following framework to fully grasp the meaning of what the bin Laden/Taliban side and the United States/international community side say and do. That is, those who carried out the attacks adopt the mode of thinking called "fundamentalism," and that of those who gathered together under the banner of anti-terrorism adopt one I call "redoism." With this framework, I read the following questions from the 9.11 attacks: (A) Which mode of thinking is superior, fundamentalism that yielded the violent attacks or redoism that gathered people together under the banner of anti-terrorism? (B) What are the implications, in the political sphere, of the answer to this question?

In order to answer these questions, the logical structures of the two distinct modes of thinking, fundamentalism and redoism, and their differences will be specified. In this connection, special attention will be paid to the following: (A) the positions of "coercion" (of which the final form is the use of violence) and "freedom" and their evaluation in the respective modes of thinking, and (B) the consequences they bring about in the political sphere. On the basis of these analyses, the theoretical superiority between the two modes of thinking will be determined.

II: The Key Concepts

The basic concepts which play important roles in the following argument will be explicated here.

(1) Choice
A choice is a selection of one set (combination) of an alternative (a plan of action) and its concomitants (those which occur concurrently with it), among two or more sets, on the ground that it, according to the chooser's calculation, is expected to bring about the most desirable outcome.

A choice is made partly under conditions which the chooser can not change. These conditions, called "data," are either set by the natural environment or manipulated by others. However, even with data, the chooser makes a selection
always on his or her own calculation.

(2) Life
Life consists of consecutive rounds of choosing an alternative (together with its concomitants), executing it, and evaluating its outcome.

(3) Coercion
Coercion is other's intervention in the chooser's process of selecting an alternative to induce the chooser to select the alternative of the former's preference, by manipulating the combination of the alternative and its concomitants, which the latter can hardly change. Even under coercion, the choice is a result of the chooser's calculation.

The following is a detailed explanation.
That an actor A (an individual or a group of individuals) coerces another actor B (another individual or another group of individuals) means A's intervention in B's selection process as follows.
A wishes B to select alternative a which benefits A, while B considers another alternative b beneficial to B. If this process is left untouched, it ends with B's selection of b. Therefore, A intervenes with B. The result is what A wished; that is, B selects alternative a on his or her own calculation. The intervention must be conducted as follows in order to bring about the above result.
A makes a set (combination) of alternative b and a price to pay when b is selected. The price must be extremely high like a hostage is to be killed. Under such circumstances, B considers another set of alternative a and a hostage to be released as less objectionable, and selects this set. That is, B selects alternative a.15

(4) Freedom
Freedom is understood as the "state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the . . . will of another or others"; in other words, "the possibility of a person's acting according to his own decisions and plans" without being "subject to the will of another."16 Therefore, the essence of freedom is that "one can choose one's own ways of acting without interference by others."

When others' action prevents one from selecting an alternative which one otherwise would have selected, the state of freedom faces grave peril. In order to secure freedom, therefore, it is necessary to prevent others from taking actions of this kind, namely, coercion.

(5) Politics
We have occasions on which we need concerted actions of all people in a given extent. For example, it is necessary for all motor vehicle operators to travel at not more than a specified speed, in order to secure traffic safety. The State, in the sense of the government, is a social device designed to organize and maintain the concerted actions of this kind among the members of a nation. Politics is what is related to the use of government in order to organize and maintain the concerted actions of this
III: Fundamentalism as a Mode of Thinking

Fundamentalism is a mode of thinking which presupposes a certain principle as infallible, affirms only those ways of acting specified by the principle, and in no way tolerates negation or questioning of them. Its process is characterized by coercion.

At the outset of thinking, fundamentalists presuppose a certain principle which they believe to be infallible so that everyone must accept it unconditionally. The logical consequence is that certain ways of acting derived from the principle are also infallible, and that everyone must accept them unconditionally.

What fundamentalists consider as desirable is that everyone accepts the ways of acting derived from their premise. This becomes endangered when people begin negating or questioning the ways thus derived. Therefore, it is necessary that those who negate or question the ways must be forced to accept them in order for sure realization of what fundamentalists consider desirable. Here, manipulation of the set of alternatives/concomitants is in need to induce them to choose the <acceptance> alternative. This certainly is a case of coercion.

Those who do not accept the alternative which fundamentalists approve are rejecting what everyone must accept unconditionally. Therefore, it is just and necessary in the end -- when other means have been exhausted -- to force acceptance even by the use of violent means.

When this mode of thinking is applied in the designing of political mechanisms, it manifests itself as political fundamentalism. Here, it is considered to be necessary that the government carries out the activities derived from a principle, which a certain individual or a certain group of individuals believes to be infallible. In order for this to be attained, it is considered to be just and necessary that coercion is exercised either to limit the extent of the electorate to those (e.g. members of a certain political party) who accept the above-mentioned activities, or, in the case where the electorate is expanded, to induce people to select the activities by combining unbearable inconveniences with the <reject> alternative; and, in actual fact, coercion is often used. The final form -- when other means have been exhausted -- is the use of violence. In the fundamentalists' mode of thinking the use of violence in the political sphere is thus justified.

The following has been made clear: When the fundamentalists' mode of thinking is active, violence is sure to be employed as a just and necessary means, when other means have been exhausted and it pays.

IV: Redoism as a Mode of Thinking

NEGISHI, Fundamentalism and Democracy
What is the mode of thinking I call "redoism" as opposed to fundamentalism? What are its characteristics, and how can it be differentiated from fundamentalism?

Before presenting the entire structure of redoism, it is appropriate to point out that freedom in redoism is not an ultimate end in itself but a means to a certain end beyond freedom. Redoism, at the outset of thinking, assumes a certain end (i.e. a state of things that people desire to realize) which has a value that is acceptable to everyone, and gives freedom a position of one of the means (necessary conditions) to this end. This placement of freedom in redoism is identical to that of the use of violence, or coercion, in fundamentalism in the sense that both are considered to be a means.

(1) Progress and Its Universal Value
Life consists of consecutive "rounds" of choices. In this process we make efforts to ensure that "things move in a better or more desirable direction" or "gradual betterment," namely, "progress." Progress can be defined as "the choice of the present round is evaluated 'more desirable' than the choice of the previous round." A specific state of things one recognizes as "progress" may be different from that recognized by someone else. However, since progress is defined as "things move in a better or more desirable direction," it is irrefutably logical to say that progress has an attribute which everyone accepts; i.e. a universal value. That "progress is not good" may mean that "I do not evaluate highly the particular state of things which others recognize as progress," but it is not logically possible to mean that "what I recognize as progress is not desirable."

(2) Conditions for Progress
Though particular states of things recognized as progress may vary from one individual to another, there are conditions necessary for everyone to make progress of one's own. Since progress has a value acceptable to everyone, these conditions also have the value of being acceptable to everyone.

These common conditions are derived from the unquestionable fact that "everyone has the possibility of making mistakes."22

i: Opportunities for Redoing
Everyone has the possibility of making mistakes. There is no assurance, therefore, that the choice of the present round is evaluated as good as or more desirable than the choice of the previous round. The last choice might be found to be a mistake. In this situation, that "one can make another choice in the following round" is a necessary condition for gradual betterment or progress; without such opportunities mistakes are frozen as they are. In order that "I" may make progress "I" must have the "opportunity for another choice" (or redoing).23

The aim of redoing is to correct the mistake of the previous round. In order to attain this aim, it is necessary that the alternative which the chooser considers to rectify the mistake must not be combined with a prohibiting price by other's intention.
of preventing the chooser's selection of the alternative. In other words, redoing requires that the choice process be void of others' act of coercion, that is, it must be "free."  

Since redoing is a necessary condition for progress which has a value acceptable to everyone, the value is carried to redoing. Likewise, since freedom (or the state void of coercion) is an indispensable condition for redoing, the value of the latter is carried to freedom; thus, the universal value of progress is indirectly carried to freedom. The value of freedom (a means), therefore, originates in progress (an end).

ii: The Function of Others

Is "my" progress ensured if only "I," but not "others," have opportunities for redoing? Because of the limits on human intellectual capacity and the amount of time and funds investable for research, everyone needs to learn what the most desirable alternative for him or her is from what others say and do. High quality alternatives can thus be obtained expeditiously. In some cases, better alternatives can not be obtained at all, thus progress is not achieved, without such opportunities.

This makes it beneficial to and necessary for "me" that "others," too, have the same opportunities for redoing as I do.

That the two requirements discussed above -- (A) one has opportunities for redoing for oneself and (B) others also have the same opportunities for redoing for themselves -- are both and concurrently met is a necessary condition for everyone to make progress. In this sense, the value of progress acceptable to everyone is carried to the requirements. This statement is applicable to all spheres of life.

(3) The Political System of Democracy

The political sphere is one related to the use of government to organize and maintain concerted actions of all members of a nation. It is indispensable that opportunities for redoing be secured in the process of deciding what activities the government should perform, if progress is to be assured. A democracy is a political system designed to secure the opportunity for redoing in politics.

We are not immune from making mistakes in political decisions, and need to make another choice for the better (or redoing) if mistakes are made. Political mechanisms to ensure the opportunities for redoing are freedoms of thought, expression and political activities, a multiparty system, periodical elections, specified terms of public office and recall, and so forth. Universal suffrage and majority rule are typical arrangements to extend the scope of those who can enjoy opportunities for redoing. A democracy is a system designed to institutionally make preparations, before mistakes are actually made, for the widest possible scope of people to make another choice in the rounds to come regarding what activities the government should perform.

Though a specific state of things regarded as progress in the political sphere...
may differ from person to person, democracy is a necessary condition for everyone to obtain progress. Therefore, it is logical to say that the value of progress acceptable to everyone is carried to democracy.

* In contrast, the political system of fundamentalism is designed to recognize only those governmental activities which are derived, by a certain individual or a certain group of individuals, from a certain principle, and to carry them out even by exercising coercion over those who do not accept them. In this sense fundamentalists’ political systems are counterposed against that of democracy, and have a value opposite to that of democracy, i.e., a negative value. Therefore, if one thinks logically, it is hardly possible to approve of it.

(4) Democracy and Coercion

How is coercion (and the use of violence as its final form) located and evaluated in democracy?

There is a misconception about democracy, which should be corrected at the beginning; that is, "democracy is a relativism and, therefore, it should tolerate thoughts which even negate democracy." As it will be made clear later, redoism as a mode of thinking which gives birth to democracy in the political sphere is not a relativism in this sense.

Redoism presupposes "progress" at the outset of thinking. By definition, a positive value is attached to this premise; therefore, everyone is expected to recognize its value and accept it. Another premise, that "everyone has the possibility of making mistakes," is also considered to be "absolutely" true as a fact. In this sense, redoism as a mode of thinking is a kind of absolutism.

One of the characteristics of redoism as a mode of thinking is that it refrains from making judgments about specific ways of acting for an actor (an individual or a group of individuals) and lets the actor decide by himself or herself. Redoism is a relativism in this sense. At the same time, it unequivocally specifies the attribute of the "arena" for the actor's choice of his or her own specific ways of acting, as "the element of coercion is removed as thoroughly as possible, and the opportunity for redoing is fully secured for everyone."27 (Those arenas which are made in the political sphere to possess such an attribute are hereafter called a "democratic decision-making arena.") In this sense, redoism is an absolutism. Thus, redoism as a mode of thinking consists of two facets, relativism and absolutism.

In the facet of absolutism, redoism considers that the selection of specific ways of acting which can result in progress is possible only in an arena void of coercion,28 and adheres to this idea under any circumstances. In order for an arena of decision-making to have such an attribute, it is necessary that the influence of those who oppose the idea be removed. Therefore, redoism considers that "when other
means have been exhausted and for the purpose of creation, maintenance or defense of such a decision-making arena, exercise of coercion is just and necessary."

Therefore, redoism considers it just and necessary that activities which threaten the existence of the arena be removed even resorting to violent measures, when other means have been exhausted and the activities' influence is not negligible. The use of military force is the final form of such violent measures. In redoism military actions to eliminate violent attacks aiming at destruction of a democratic arena for political decision-making are thus justified. It should be kept in mind, however, that military actions of this kind can be justified for their function of cancelling violent attacks' effect of depriving those attacked of "the political environment in which everyone can make choices without being coerced by others."

Thus, the appropriateness of a particular military action should be determined on this basis, and with due consideration for its accompanying developments.

Redoism considers such activities just and necessary, that aim at creating a decision-making arena of the above-mentioned nature in a place where it does not exist yet. The final resort by "movements for democratization" to violent measures is considered to be theoretically just and necessary in this mode of thinking. It should be kept in mind, however, that measures of this kind can be justified for their effect of creating "the political environment in which everyone can make choices without being coerced by others." Thus, the appropriateness of a particular movement which claims democratization should be determined on this basis, and with due consideration for its accompanying developments.

* Redoism and fundamentalism both assume certain premises at the outset of thinking. The difference lies in the following:

(A) While the former tries to explicate grounds for its premises considered absolute, the latter rejects any such trials, claiming that its premises defy every criticism.

(B) What the former unequivocally specifies is confined to the attribute of the arena for decision-making, whereas the latter so specifies both the attribute of the decision-making arena and specific ways of acting which are decided therein.

(5) Definition of the Body for Political Decision-Making
In the discussion, since (3) of this chapter, of the application of redoism to the political sphere, the logic was indifferent to the scope of the people who organize the concerted actions.

Redoism specifies the attributes of the decision-making arena to be "the element of coercion is removed as thoroughly as possible, and the opportunity for redoing is fully secured for everyone," but sets no conditions to the scope of the decision-making body -- the "nationals" in the case of political decision-making. What this mode of thinking asks for is that the opportunity for redoing is also secured as extensively as possible in the process of deciding the scope; that is, at least, redefinition of the body for political decision-making is not institutionally prohibited.
In reality, however, the redefinition can not easily be made. Here arises a problem which has prospects of developing into violence.

It is a matter of how to treat a minority -- those who consider that they have been continuously and fixedly in the position where their voices are not heard -- in the democratic decision-making process of what activities the government should perform. Problems of this kind arise in democracies and, thus, activities which the minority performs in this connection are likely to be seen by the majority as "a challenge to democracy," and this may be the source of some confusion.

Theoretically speaking, the people in the minority also have the possibility of taking the majority position in the following rounds of decision-making, and the opportunity for redoing is not denied to them. It may be expected that those who recognize the value of democracy are motivated to wait for the following rounds. Therefore, from the viewpoint of redoism, no theoretical problem is present here. However, those who occupy the position where their voices are heard need to show consideration in connection with the following.

The status of a majority is relative to the scope of the body for decision-making. Since its redefinition in non-political spheres can easily be made, the problem of the minority discussed above can be solved when the people in the minority create a new body in which they can form a majority and change their affiliation to the new one. In contrast, the political body for decision-making can not easily be redefined.

To make the situation more complicated, the outcome of majority decisions on governmental activities, in real politics, tends to benefit the majority and be against the minority interests. Thus, when the present majority sees benefits in the present situation which fixedly keeps a particular group of people in the minority position, the outcome of majority decisions by the present body becomes hard to alter. Under such circumstances and if the people in the minority share a strong feeling of identity, especially racial and/or religious, they show a tendency to claim redefinition of the present body for political decision-making, which may lead to violence.

Claims of this kind are related to creation of the decision-making arena where one selects specific ways of acting. If the nature of the arena to be created satisfies the conditions of democracy, the claims can be treated the same as movements for democratization. Therefore, the use of violence for redefinition of the body for political decision-making, from redoism's viewpoint, can be justified on the same theoretical basis as that of democratization; thus, the appropriateness of a particular minority movement for redefinition of a body for political decision-making should be determined on the same basis. In this connection, it is the majority side, which can secure its own interests by maintenance of the status quo, that we expect to exercise self-restraint in not, institutionally and actually, prohibiting the redefinition.

V: A Comparison of the Two Modes of Thinking and Their
Political Implications

Redoism as a mode of thinking proceeds from a premise of "progress" (an end) which has by definition a value acceptable to everyone, specifies necessary conditions (means) for everyone to attain it, and proposes that society be shaped to meet the conditions specified. Therefore, if one adopts this mode of thinking, the possibility of making one's own progress becomes greater.

In contrast, fundamentalism as a mode of thinking is constituted to deny the above-mentioned conditions for progress. Here, that "things move in a better or more desirable direction" becomes a mere chance occurrence. Therefore, fundamentalism has a value opposite to that of redoism, i.e., a negative value.

In this sense, redoism is decidedly superior to fundamentalism. When you choose between one alternative which enhances the possibility of obtaining what you recognize as progress -- the choice of the present round is evaluated more desirable than the choice of the previous round -- and another which eliminates the possibility, it is evidently wise to choose the former.

In the following lies another advantage of redoism.

Fundamentalism has a serious defect, in its logic, of not showing grounds for absolutization of a principle assumed as its premise. Thus, fundamentalists' assertions number at least as many as the number of principles placed as the premise; even a single premise may yield more than one interpretation. Therefore, the states of things which fundamentalists respectively consider as imperative can not logically converge into one. This is precisely a state of theomachy. What can settle this situation is nothing other than resorting to violent means with the possibility of bloodshed.35

In contrast, redoism makes plain the unquestionable nature of its two premises; one being a value statement "acceptable to everyone by definition" (progress) and another being a factual statement "being true of everyone" (human fallibility). Then, it tries to show a conclusion, derived from the premises, which is undeniable for anyone if one thinks logically. General acceptance of the logic and the conclusion is yet to be gained. However, the advantage of redoism is that there is at least a theoretical possibility of general and solid consent concerning the nature of the decision-making arena (void of coercion) and the process of selecting one's own ways of acting (letting everyone decide by themselves).

Observations of the actual thought process of redoism convince us that it has the practical possibility of settling a conflict of opinion without resort to violence. The process shows the following characteristics.

At the outset of thinking one assumes, as a premise, a factual understanding that everyone has the possibility of making mistakes. On this premise, no consideration is given at all to the exercising of coercion -- including the use of violence when other means have been exhausted -- intended to influence others' decision-making process, except to secure the decision-making arena with opportunities for redoing.36 The same premise makes one realize that it is necessary
for him or her to get to know other alternatives besides the ones selected in the past, as regards matters other than the nature of the decision-making arena. Those other alternatives may be obtained by his or her own power of thought or through learning from what others say and do. Placing all the alternatives in various end-means contexts, one selects an alternative on the basis of relative superiority of ends or relative contribution of means to realization of ends; without laying the faculty of thought idle (see VII (1) ii) especially when the alternatives in question originate in religious and/or historical sources. Since one is aware of his or her own possibility of making mistakes, adequate consideration is taken for assurance of opportunities for redoing not only for him or her and those who stand on his or her side, but also for those who gather on the opposing side, especially the people in the minority (see VII (3)). A new choice is thus made. The alternative selected here may be either a product of one's own power of thought or that which is learned from others. Here lies a possibility of escaping from an impasse, which otherwise necessitates the use of violence.

Redoism is superior to fundamentalism in the sense that it has a theoretical and practical possibility of settling a conflict of opinion without bloodshed.

Now, political consequences of redoism and fundamentalism will be compared in the following paragraphs.

The political consequence of redoism is a democracy. It is a system designed to institute opportunities for redoing in the selection process of governmental activities, as a necessary condition for making "progress." In this sense the universal value of progress, acceptable to everyone, is carried to the democratic system.

In contrast, the political consequence of fundamentalism endangers progress in the political sphere. In this sense it holds a value opposite to that of democracy, i.e., a negative value. Therefore, it is hardly possible that one will accept it if one thinks logically.

It goes without saying that the possibility of redoism to settle a conflict of opinion without bloodshed shows a marked effect in the political sphere. Incidentally, the core of the political principle of the separation of religion and politics lies in introduction of the mode of thinking with the above-mentioned characteristics and an accompanying possibility of non-violent settlement of a conflict of opinion into the decision-making process of governmental activities (see VII (1) ii).

As is demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, redoism as a mode of thinking and its political implications are superior to fundamentalism and its political implications.

VI: What is Terrorism?

The violent attacks of September 11, 2001 which terrified the world are usually called "terrorism." This article has so far carefully refrained from using the term, as there
is no general consensus about what to call "terrorism." Not all acts of violence with political intentions are called as such.

We need, in our vocabulary, such words as remind us that the objects they designate have negative values. However, when they are used without convincing reasons, they may produce problems which we can not disregard. For example, when one calls one's opponents' acts of violence "terrorism," the consequence is often that one holds those people in contempt, and ignores or denies whatever significance the acts may have. On top of that comes "political oppression in the name of eradication of terrorism."

In order to avoid problems of this kind, we need convincing answers to what kind of violence we should call "terrorism" and what are the grounds for calling it thus, and a general consensus about the usage of the term based on the answers. Redoism, theoretical superiority of which has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, can provide the answers which no one can reasonably reject if one thinks logically; thus, it can supply a solid basis for an agreed usage of the term "terrorism." This, in turn, will reveal differences in significance of various cases of violence occurring now in the world, and contribute to prevention of unfair political oppression caused by an easygoing use of the term.

(1) Attaching the Label "Terrorism"
"Terrorism" is not synonymous with the "use of violence." Violence may be used for various aims, but only those cases intending to force acceptance of political demands are called as such.

Not all cases of violence with political aims are called "terrorism." There is a tendency to call violence of one's opponents' "terrorism," but that of one's own is definitely not regarded as such. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which will be analyzed later, Israel justifies its military actions as "self-defense" against terrorism practiced by the Palestinian side, and the latter denounces the military actions of the former as "state terrorism."

The distinction between "what is called terrorism" and "what is not" corresponds to the judgments of "I can not approve it" and "I can." It is not that one disapproves a case of violence because it is classified as terrorism on the basis of a set of objective attributes, but that the label "terrorism" is used because it is not considered to be "approvable" on certain grounds. In sum, "terrorism" is a label that one attaches to cases of violence, with political aims, which one can not approve.

By attaching a label symbolizing a grave negative value to the opponents' use of violence, one, consciously or unconsciously, conceals what is disadvantageous to one's side, holds those people in contempt without giving clear reasons, and ignores or denies whatever significance their acts may have.

The definition of "terrorism" functions as a selector of the ground for justification of violence, and claims its appropriateness. The following will be treated in the sections to come: (A) Various grounds for justification of violence used in the labeling of "terrorism" will be made clear. (B) Their comparative
appropriateness will be examined to find the most convincing ground. (C) Different meanings, attached to various cases of violence on the newly found ground will be specified.

(2) The Appropriateness of Labeling
There are two different modes of using the label "terrorism."

One is the mode of labeling based on the distinction between "that which advances one's own interests" and "that which hampers them." The criterion here is one's own immediate interests, not being examined from any theoretical viewpoint. It is likely here that even a case of violence with a theoretically positive significance is evaluated negatively and called "terrorism," if it harms one's own immediate interests. In addition, the loss and gain resulting from a given situation are subject to change. Therefore, according to this criterion, the same cases of violence may be called either "terrorism" or otherwise depending on the person (evaluator), time and place. Here are repeated calculations of immediate loss and gain on an isolated and case-by-case basis. Thus, it is logically impossible to achieve a consensus on attaching the label "terrorism." In sum, it is not appropriate to adopt this mode of labeling as the basis for a consensus.

Another is the mode of labeling based on the distinction between "what is justifiable" and "what is not." This distinction is made on the basis of a certain theory. A theory performs the function of determining each element's position in the system it formulates. I call this position "a theoretical significance." In the case of the theories which act as the basis for labeling of "terrorism," the significance means "the degree of contribution to realization of the system's premise, namely, the aim," and justification of each element can be given on the basis of this degree. Therefore, an analysis of a theory can reveal positions which various actions occupy in a system which it formulates. And, then, comparison of the appropriateness of premises (aims) of opposing theories, can give birth to the possibility of determining the theoretical superiority among them. In sum, it is appropriate to make use of some theory as the basis for a consensus about the usage of the term "terrorism."

(3) Theoretical Grounds for Labeling
An indispensable attribute of "terrorism" is "means to coerce others into acceptance of certain governmental activities." An agreement can be reached at this point, even among those who have a serious difference of opinion concerning specifically what to attach the label "terrorism" to.

Other characteristics of "terrorism" can be obtained from comparison of redoism and fundamentalism which are opposed to each other as regard the role of coercion. Therefore, in the following sections, their respective ways of justification or denial of acts of violence, on the basis of the degree of contribution to realization of their respective goals assumed as premises, will be examined.

i: Redoism as the Ground for Justification of Violence (See IV)
[Goal]
The choice, of governmental activities, of the present round is evaluated more desirable than that of the previous round.

[Necessary condition]
The arena for the choice of governmental activities is organized in such a way that the element of coercion is removed as thoroughly as possible and that the opportunity for redoing is fully secured for everyone.

[Justification of violence]
In order for the arena for the choice of governmental activities to have such an attribute, it is necessary that the influence of those who are opposed to this arena be removed. Therefore, when other means have been exhausted and for the purpose of creation, maintenance or defense of such a decision-making arena, the use of violence is just and necessary.

(A) The use of violence for the purpose of creation, maintenance or defense of an arena, void of the element of coercion for everyone, for the choice of governmental activities is justified; because it contributes to attainment of the goal.\(^\text{46}\) (See IV (4))

The following three types are included here.
1. Activities to remove such actions that threaten the existence of the arena of this nature: e.g. military actions to strike back attacks against the democratic system. (See IV (4))
2. Activities to create an arena of this kind in a place where it does not exist yet: e.g. movements for democratization (See IV (4))
3. Activities for redefinition of the existing democratic decision-making body by those who are in the minority position: e.g. movements for independence by minority races. (See IV (5))

(B) The use of violence for the purpose other than (A) is not justified; because it does not contribute to attainment of the goal.

\textbf{ii: Fundamentalism as the Ground for Justification of Violence} (See III)

[Goal]
Those activities, and only those, which are derived from a presupposed principle are actually performed by the government.

[Necessary condition]
1. Coercion of those who otherwise oppose themselves to adoption of the governmental activities into acceptance, and
2. Creation, maintenance or defense of a political decision-making arena which permits exertion of coercion in such a way.

[Justification of violence]
In order for the activities to be performed for certain by the government, it is just and necessary that coercion is exercised over those who oppose, when other means have been exhausted.

(A) The following uses of violence are justified; because they contribute to attainment of the goal.
1. The use of violence for the purpose of forcing acceptance of the
governmental activities (except 2 below) derived from a presupposed principle.

2. The use of violence for the purpose of creation, maintenance or defense of a political decision-making arena permitting 1 above.\(^{47}\) (See III)

(B) The use of violence for the purpose other than (A) is not justified; because it does not contribute to attainment of the goal.

(4) **Comparative Superiority of the Theoretical Grounds**

Which is appropriate to the grounds for justification of violence, redoism or fundamentalism? The answer can be obtained by comparison of the value of the goals which they presuppose.

To state the conclusion first, the answer is definitely "redoism."

Redoism presupposes as its goal "progress," i.e., that "the choice of the present round is evaluated more desirable than the choice of the previous round" (see IV (1)).

It is evidently wise to choose one alternative which enhances the possibility of obtaining what you recognize as progress, rather than another which eliminates that possibility (see V). Therefore, the premise of redoism is expected to be evaluated positively and accepted by everyone, if one thinks logically. In contrast, fundamentalists' presupposed goal is located opposite to that of redoism, and, thus, has a negative value (see V).

In sum, i (A) above is desirable and justifiable to everyone. Therefore, it is appropriate to attach the label "terrorism" to the use of violence for attainment of goals other than i (A), that is, i (B) above which includes ii (A).

(5) **Necessity of Understanding the Theoretical Significance of Violence**

As has been pointed out already, attachment of the label "terrorism" has a tendency to make one hold others in contempt, and ignore or deny whatever significance their acts may have. This, however, is not a proper way to grasp the world, because it does not disclose the grounds for such a view and its validity. A biased understanding thus arrived at may be one of the causes for aggravation of current conflicts occurring in various places.

The following is of great importance in this connection.

The consideration above demands that one should acknowledge the significance of others' acts, without complacently attaching the label "terrorism" to them. It further demands, firstly, that cases of violence be classified into two groups; the basis of classification is a goal to be realized, namely, "the choice of governmental activities of the present round is evaluated more desirable than that of the previous round," and the groups thus classified are one whose members either hamper or have no bearing on realization of the goal and another whose members contribute to its realization. Secondly, it demands that the former be called "terrorism" while the latter be not.

It is necessary that this goal be attained not only for "me" but also for everyone else (see IV (2) ii). In other words, it is not proper that one denies the significance of contributing to realization of others' (including one's opponents') goals.
(that "their choice, of governmental activities, of this round is evaluated by themselves more desirable than that of the previous round"), on the ground that it is not one's own business.

Therefore, we need to acknowledge that some cases of others' violence, which are not considered to increase "my" immediate profit at first sight, have a theoretical, positive significance beneficial to "me."

One of the basic causes for outbreak and aggravation of current conflicts in the world is that the parties concerned do not adopt this mode of thinking, namely, redoism. If one takes action without taking heed of others' circumstances either by viewing nothing beyond one's own immediate interests (see (2) of this chapter) or by thinking in the fundamentalists' mode (see the 5th paragraph of V), conflicts can not be avoided. In contrast, the goal which redoism presupposes can be "acceptable to everyone if one thinks logically," and, thus, there can theoretically arise no difference of opinion with regard to it. Because, in redoism, one takes action to secure for everyone else, as for oneself, the necessary condition for obtaining what everyone evaluates highly (see the 4th paragraph of (5) of this chapter), and the use of violence which redoism justifies is confined to such cases that aim at securing the democratic decision-making arena which is acceptable to everyone if one thinks logically (see (3) i of this chapter), actual causes of conflict are minimized. Furthermore, in redoism, alternatives which one selects may be those which one learned from what others say and do; this is something just the opposite of a divisive confrontation. Here lies a possibility of escaping from an impasse, which otherwise necessitates the use of violence. (See the 8th paragraph of V.) Therefore, conversion of the parties to redoism may be of considerable help toward solution of the violent conflicts occurring in all parts of the world.

VII: Problems Beyond the Reach of Logical Thinking

What academic research, on the kind of subjects treated in this article, can do is to explicate the line of reasoning in relation to the subject and persuasion of the reader to the researcher's way of thinking. Even if the analysis is logical and the acceptance of the conclusion is inevitable if one thinks logically, there is no guarantee that people will actually accept the conclusion and take action in accordance with it. To be more specific, when the chapters up to VI are published, there is no assurance that people will actually think in line with redoism and create and maintain the democratic mechanisms in the political sphere.

If the persuasion fails and there remain individuals and groups of individuals who think in line with fundamentalism, there is a possibility of violent actions taken by them for attainment of another claim of theirs.

To minimize this complication, we need such social arrangements that induce people to adopt the mode of thinking of redoism and motivate them to take actions to create and maintain democratic mechanisms in the political sphere.
(1) Unsoundness of Thinking

There are possibilities that soundness of thinking is damaged by some causes. Unsound thinking results in undesirable choices; an example is rejection of the kind of conclusions this article reached.

So long as the consequences of choices are confined to the chooser himself or herself, there is no reason to meddle in his or her affairs. However, when governmental activities are performed according to unsound choices, all members of a country, or even people of other countries in the contemporary reality of international politics which is characterized by heavy interdependence, are detrimentally influenced.

In this sense, it is necessary to prevent unsound modes of thinking from being active in the political sphere.

i: Improvement of Conditions for Development of Thinking Faculties

Several causes can be specified that damage soundness of thinking.

One of the causes is "lack of logic" in thinking. The faculty of logical thinking can be acquired by training, or through education.

Another is exemplified by an obstinate smoker. Medical science today has scientifically proved a correlation between smoking and fatal diseases such as lung cancer and heart diseases. Nonetheless, or even being well aware of it, some people do not abstain from smoking, underestimating the magnitude of the price to pay in a remote future. Here, working is the emotion of "unwillingness to face up to reality."

The faculties of "objectification of the self" and "cognitive flexibility" are necessary for us to escape from this pitfall in thinking and make sound choices.

Social arrangements in developing countries today are not adequately made for children to acquire the mental faculties of logical thinking, objectification of the self and cognitive flexibility. In realization that redoism can only function with the soundness of thinking in the sense discussed above, social arrangements -- for improvement of education, intermediate communities and the family budget -- to promote development of children's sound thought faculties are in need in all countries in order to attain the widespread acceptance of redoism. One of the significance of aid to developing countries should be understood in this connection.

It is unlikely that a country will take measures to influence education, intermediate communities and the family budget of other countries without obtaining their consent. Even with consent, these measures must be justified by their effectiveness in providing opportunities for children to acquire the mental faculties of logical thinking, objectification of the self and cognitive flexibility. Thus, the appropriateness of a particular measure taken for this purpose should be determined on the basis of this effectiveness and with due consideration for its accompanying developments.

ii: Establishment of the Political System of the Separation of Religion

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Soundness of thinking can be damaged by another factor. Even in a society where most people are considered to have a minimum of the mental faculties, there are some who entertain an unquestioning belief in a certain principle. This is "suspension of thinking."

In the fundamentalists' mode of thinking a principle assumed as a premise defies examination of its logical grounds, and is deemed absolute. This is a case of an unquestioning belief. When governmental activities are chosen on the basis of this kind of unsound thinking, it is hardly possible to disregard their negative influences.

An example of the object of an unquestioning belief is a religious doctrine, but it is not limited to this. In consideration of this, it is necessary that the core conception of the separation of religion and politics should be taken as "exclusion of the fundamentalists' mode of thinking in general from the political sphere," going beyond a mere detachment of religion, a sphere particularly prone to fundamentalism, from politics. Therefore, all possible endeavors are to be made for establishment of the system of the separation of religion and politics, in the sense explicated here.

From this standpoint, "religion" here means all possible forms of fundamentalism, which are to be excluded from the political sphere. Logically speaking, Marxism-Leninism constitutes an object to be excluded.53 What is expected of political studies is examination of conditions for permission, under the democratic political system, of actors whose actions are products of the fundamentalists' mode of thinking.

(2) The Magnitude of Other Goals
Wide acceptance of redoism as a mode of thinking does not necessarily guarantee actual establishment of democratic mechanisms in the sphere of politics.

Democracy, the embodiment of redoism in the political sphere, is a derivative of "progress," which is only a component of life. This means that progress is conditional on a secure life. Therefore, it is a prerequisite for democracy that the minimum necessary for subsistence is ensured. When it is threatened, the value of progress must yield to that of survival.54

When other goals are considered more valuable than progress, realization of democracy as a necessary condition for progress in the political sphere has a lower priority. However, subsistence mentioned above seems to be the one and only case of such goals.55

Nonetheless, realization of democracy in the political sphere is something to be desired, even when one lives below the subsistence level. Thus, it is necessary to consider maintenance of law and order and a minimum supply of food as preconditions for democracy. A significance of food aid to developing countries and intervention in other countries to restore law and order should be understood in this connection.

It is unlikely that a country will take measures to provide food aid and the restoration of law and order of other countries without obtaining their consent.
with consent, these measures must be justified by their effectiveness in providing preconditions for creation of a democratic decision-making arena. Thus, the appropriateness of a particular measure taken for these purposes should be determined on the basis of this effectiveness and with due consideration for its accompanying developments. A special attention should be paid to the possibility that a pursuit of a country's own interests is often disguised as an intervention only to restore law and order for the sake of the intervened.

(3) Considerations Which the Majority Is Expected to Show

Another problem needs to be discussed, which arises under a democratic system and is apt to escape general attention.

Majority decisions often result in damages to the minority interests. Even so, they should not place the minority in a position where redoing is prohibited, since the aim of democracy is to ensure the opportunity for redoing. To be more specific, the majority should give heed to the following: (A) To refrain from doing what does not allow redoing, and (B) to provide a minimum of conditions necessary for the minority to regain a firm social footing.

The majority need to always pay attention to whether governmental activities of their choice meet these two requirements or not. If the minority is found to be in a position without these conditions, the majority need to make efforts to improve the situation. By their so doing, the minority become able to live their own respective lives, and show ideas of and actual ways of life, from which the majority may learn and obtain alternatives suited to their preferences.

A significance of provision of the domestic safety net and economic aid to developing countries by advanced ones should be understood in connection with (B).57

VIII: A Theoretical Grasp of the Meaning of the 9.11 Attacks

The violent attacks of September 11, 2001 and the following military actions in Afghanistan by the United States and some other countries can be grasped as follows in the theoretical framework this article presents.

(1) The Side That Attacked

The identity of those who are responsible for the attacks has not been established yet. However, it is obvious that bin Laden gave support to the attacks (see I (1) and (2)). His claims can be understood as consistently as possible if his mode of thinking is taken as that of fundamentalism.

The principle assumed as his premise is the doctrine of Islam. According to the fundamentalists' mode of thinking, governments, Islamic or non-Islamic, ought to take measures as bin Laden's interpretation of the doctrine. Since the political reality (as bin Laden views) does not allow realization of the interpretation by the use of non-violent means, the 9.11 violent attacks were just and necessary. Bin Laden's
What bin Laden specifies as the goals of the 9.11 violent attacks are that the United States ceases supporting Israel and pulls its own troops out of Saudi Arabia (see I (1) and (2)). The attacks intended to force the U. S. Government to accept the claims. It is obvious that the claims intend to deprive the people of the United States of the opportunity for decision-making without being coerced by others, to say nothing of somewhere establishing a decision-making arena void of coercive elements. Therefore, in this article's framework, this case of coercion (or violence) should not be justified, and is exactly what we should call "terrorism."

(2) The American Side
The figure who took initiative in actions to strike back against the violent attacks endorsed by bin Laden was President Bush of the United States of America. Immediately after the attacks a tendency to expect a "vengeance" for them among the American people including Bush himself prevailed. Though this upsurge of sentiment subsided as time passed, it seems to have influenced Bush's statements afterwards. His claims can be understood as least inconsistently as possible if his mode of thinking is taken as that of redoism.

Bush acknowledges that freedom has an irreplaceable value, locates violent attacks to destroy a free decision-making arena in an opposite position, and maintains that military actions against them can be justified. All of these arguments can be derived from redoism.

Freedom is the state of being able to make choices without interference (coercion) by others, and located in a position opposite to violent attacks with the intention to destroy the free decision-making arena. Its value is that of a means (a necessary condition) to an end, namely, "progress" of which value is, by definition, acceptable to everyone. To give up this means (freedom) signifies abandonment of progress, which can not be accepted under any circumstances. Therefore, it is just and necessary that actions to destroy the means should be eradicated even by the use of military force when other means have been exhausted. Bush's line of thought (if he thinks logically and systematically) can be described as above.

It is understood that the military actions taken in Afghanistan were carried out for the purpose of cancelling the 9.11 attacks' effect of destroying "the political environment in which everyone can make choices without being coerced by others" (see I (2) i). Therefore, in the framework presented by this article, the military actions in question are just and necessary; thus, they should not be called "terrorism." It should be kept in mind, however, that military actions of this kind can be justified only for their function of cancelling the effect mentioned above, and that casualties and property damages per se inflicted by the military actions are not justified.

IX: A Key to the Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The theoretical framework this article presents was originally developed to grasp the
new situation which emerged in the aftermath of the 9.11 attacks. However, what has been discussed so far is, in general terms, the subject of "how to evaluate the acts of violence with political intents and what is a proper way to deal with them." The events of September 2001 in the United States functioned merely as a push button to forcefully remind us of the subject.

Unfortunately, there are many other cases of violence in the world today, which equally remind us of this subject. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most serious case of its kind today. Here has arisen a vicious circle of violent acts -- suicide bombings of the Palestinian side and military counterattacks of the Israeli side.\(^\text{60}\)

If the theoretical framework functions, it will give us a systematic understanding of the conflict, and suggestions useful for the solution of the conflict may be obtained therefrom.

The framework urges us to convert to redoism. When we are confronted with a case of violence, it is expected that we will try to find out theoretical significance given by redoism. The significance is the degree of contribution to creation, maintenance or defense of an arena, void of coercion for everyone, for the choice of governmental activities. From the viewpoint of this significance, the state of confrontation between Israel and Palestine is understood as follows.

(1) The Palestinian Side
The Palestinian people who do not have their own arena for the choice of governmental activities are taking pains to establish the State of Palestine with a political decision-making arena void of coercion for everyone, namely, a democratic political system.\(^\text{61}\) In this sense, their activities should be acknowledged as a case of a movement for democratization in spite of Israeli labeling of them as "terrorism:" specifically, a movement to create anew a democratic decision-making arena by those who left the area under Israeli rule, and a movement to redefine the body for political decision-making by those who remained in the area to become a minority.

Now, the democratization which the Palestinian side craves for is impeded by the acts of the Israeli side. Therefore, violent measures taken by the former side, when other means have been exhausted, for the purpose of stopping the acts of the latter side are theoretically justified. (See 2 and 3 of VI (3) i.) It should be kept in mind, however, that measures of this kind can be justified only for their effect of creating a political decision-making arena void of coercion for everyone. In other words, casualties and property damages per se inflicted by the use of violence are not justified.

(2) The Israeli Side
The Israeli people have established a state of their own with a political decision-making arena void of coercion for everyone.\(^\text{62}\) To them, the Palestinian movement for democratization seems to function as a destructive factor to the democratic decision-making arena already in their hands. Therefore, violent
measures taken by the Israeli people, when other means have been exhausted, for the purpose of defending the decision-making arena are theoretically justified. It should be kept in mind, however, that measures of this kind can be justified only for their effect of defending a political decision-making arena void of coercion for everyone. In other words, casualties and property damages per se inflicted by the use of violence are not justified.

In sum, Israeli actions resulted in a situation in which, in general terms, actions taken by one political entity to defend its own existing democratic decision-making arena function as a deterrent to another's creation of such an arena for itself.

(3) The Theoretical Solution for Conflict-Settling

[Premise for solution]
Two different political entities are trying to maintain/establish a state in the same area.

[Prerequisite for solution]
Leave no cause for future conflicts: Let both sides be free from claims for democratization (2 and 3 of VI (3) i).

[One and only solution]
Coexistence of two democratic political entities in the same area.

It is obvious that various preparations should be made before the solution is realized. This article does not intend to give an answer to such a question as "what could we do to exit from the vicious circle of suicide bombings and retaliative military actions?" What this article can do is to be of help to the basic solution of the conflict through converting those who are concerned to the mode of thinking of redoism, though this seems circuitous.

i: Requirements from the Israeli Side for Realization of the Theoretical Solution

What is required from the Israeli people is to accept the conclusion arrived at in the chapters through VI, and convert to redoism; that is to say, acknowledge the Palestinian activities as a case of movements for democratization, and stop labeling them as "terrorism." As is already clear, it is not a proper way of grasping the world to ignore the significance of democratization theoretically found in activities of the opposing side for the reason that it is simply others' business.

The Israeli people hold a dominant position as compared with the Palestinians in the sense that their interests can be secured by maintenance of the status quo. Under circumstances like this, it is the people in the dominant position from whom we expect special considerations shown for those who are in an inferior position. (See IV (5).) It is required from the Israeli people that they should acknowledge themselves as holding a dominant position and thus being expected to show special considerations and that they should accept coexistence of Israel with the State of Palestine.
ii: Requirements from the Palestinian Side for Realization of the Theoretical Solution

What is required from the Palestinian people is also to accept the conclusion arrived at in the chapters through VI, and convert to redoism; that is to say, acknowledge themselves as an actor for democratization, and realize that their activities endanger the Israeli democratic political decision-making arena.

Indispensable for realization of the theoretical solution is acknowledgment by the Palestinians of violent acts taken by the Palestinian minority fundamentalists as "terrorism" which has a grave negative value. The Palestinian Authority should not only convert itself to redoism, but also urge the fundamentalists to convert to this mode of thinking. At the same time, it is necessary that every possible measure should be taken for prevention of suicide bombings inflicting many casualties and grave property damages which can not be justified from redoism's viewpoint.

(4) Redoism and the Possibility to Escape from an Impasse

One of the consequences of conversion to redoism is disappearance of absolutization of a certain governmental activity without examining grounds for its justification (i.e., suspension of thinking) in the thought process.

As has been already indicated, the thought process in redoism shows the following characteristics (for a detailed discussion, see V): (A) A factual understanding that everyone has the possibility of making mistakes is set forth as a premise. (B) No consideration is given at all to exercise of coercion, except to secure the decision-making arena with opportunities for redoing. (C) Attention is paid to what others say and do as a source of alternatives besides one's own power of thought. (D) The alternative selected can be either a product of one's own power of thought or that which is learned from others. Here lies the possibility of escaping from an impasse, which otherwise necessitates the use of violence.

The theoretical framework this article presents was originally developed to grasp the meaning of the new situation which emerged in the aftermath of the 9.11 attacks. Besides, this chapter tried to apply it to the ever aggravating Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The framework, based on comparison between fundamentalism and redoism, can unravel the complications caused by the conflict, reveal the theoretical meaning of each action taken by both sides, and pave the way for a non-violent and basic settlement of the conflict by urging both sides to convert to redoism.

X: Responsibility of Political Scientists

The kind of discussion developed here on redoism as a mode of thinking has been little attempted in Political Science. My own articles on the subject have been published only in 1982 and 1992 in Japanese and 1984 and 2001 in English. The subject matter has not commonly been acknowledged as relevant; to say nothing of a
general acceptance of the conclusion.

Most social scientists including those in Political Science take little interest in subjects of this kind. There is a tendency among them to detach themselves from the problem of values for the reason that it is beyond the reach of science.

The same confrontation between the two opposing modes of thinking, namely, fundamentalism and redoism, should have been recognized as such in 1991 when Soviet Russia collapsed. At that time, most political and social scientists misinterpreted the fact of its ending as a full theoretical refutation of Marxism-Leninism, and did not make thorough inquiries into the matter. We have to concede that we failed to give an answer to one of the most important subjects of all.

I admit this to be gross negligence of duty on the part of Political Scientists, and regard them as partially responsible for the 9.11 attacks. How can we expect ordinary people to act properly and reasonably in the face of the confrontation between two modes of thinking, fundamentalism yielding terrorism and redoism resulting in democracy? It becomes possible only after researchers specializing in the subject find convincing answers.
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1 This is a combined version of two papers by Negishi, published in Japanese, entitled "Fundamentalism and Democracy" (Hougaku Kenkyu, vol. 75, no. 3, March 2002, pp. 1-35) and "Fundamentalism and Democracy -- A Sequel: Terrorism and the Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (Hougaku Kenkyu, vol. 75, no. 9, September 2002, pp. 1-18).

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3 President Bush offered the same interpretation in his Congressional Address on September 20, 2001. He said that "[a]l Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world -- and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere." (See web page entitled "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.)

4 See Secretary of State Powell's remarks to the press on September 13, 2001 (see web page entitled "On-The-Record Briefing (1300 hrs)" at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4910.htm).

5 See bin Laden's statement on a video tape televised by Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite television station, on October 7, 2001. There, he mentioned "neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed", and "[w]hen Almighty God rendered successful a convoy of Muslims, the vanguards of Islam, He allowed them to destroy the United States." (See web page entitled "Bin Laden's warning: full text" at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1585636.stm.) Also see footnote [4] below.

6 See the televised video tape of October 7 (see web page entitled "Bin Laden's warning: full text" at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1585636.stm). There bin Laden said that the incidents of terrorism in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam "divided the entire world into two regions - one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity", "every Muslim should rush to defend his religion", and "[t]he winds of faith and change have blown to remove falsehood from the [Arabian] peninsula of Prophet Mohammed". On the December 26 televised video tape, he mentioned "[w]e say our terror against America is blessed terror in order to put an end to suppression, in order for the United States to stop its support to Israel" (see web page entitled "Bin Laden calls Sept. 11 attacks 'blessed terror'" at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/26/ret.bin.laden.statement/), and
indirectly condemned the military actions by the United States.

7 See President Bush's following statements: In his September 12, 2001 remarks he said that "[the 9.11 attacks] were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack", "[t]his enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world", and "[t]he freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side" (see web page entitled "Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team" at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html), and also stated that "[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime" in his Congressional Address of September 20, 2001 (see web page entitled "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People" contained in http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).

8 The doctrine of Islam seems to allow opposing interpretations. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia delivered a speech at the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting held in Oman on December 30, 2001, saying that it is the duty of all Muslims today to forcefully and unequivocally condemn all acts of terror without hesitation, and to denounce whoever supports terrorists in word or deed (see web page entitled "Address by HRH Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz" at http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/01-spa/GCC-Abd-01.htm). In contrast, it is said there were many ulemas, in many mosques in the street, who preached that infidels who threaten Muslims should be the target of a holy war. (Yomiuri Shimbun, January 5, 2002, morning ed., p. 7).

9 President Bush, in his address delivered shortly after the launching of the military operations in Afghanistan, said that "[s]ince September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice" (see web page entitled "Presidential Address to the Nation" at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html), but gave no explanations beyond it.

10 Bin Laden, on the above-mentioned televised video tape of December 2001, mentioned that the bomb which exploded in the 1998 attack against the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which the U. S. Government condemned as "terrorism," weighed a little short of two tons, whereas the bombs used by the U. S. troops in Afghanistan weighed seven tons each (see web page entitled "Usama bin Ladin's Video Message Broadcast by Al-Jazeera Television on December, 26th, 2001" at http://www.robert-fisk.com/usama_video_text_26dec2001.htm), suggesting an understanding that the "terrorism" of his side and the "anti-terrorism" military actions belong to the same class thus allowing them to be compared as such.

11 For the anti-war tendency, see Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2001, morning ed., p. 34, and Asahi Shimbun, October 9, 2001, morning ed., p. 35. In the opinions which reject the military actions of "anti-terrorism," a violent act is said to result only in a chain of violent acts (see, for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, January 8, 2002, morning ed., p. 38). Sakamoto Ryuichi's idea of "hisen" ("no war" in English) is another example (see Sakamoto Ryuichi et al., ed. and trans., Hisen (Tokyo: Gentou-Sha, 2002)).
An article entitled "Majority of the Informed except Those in the U. S. Answered 'U. S. Policies Gave Rise to Terrorism'" reported: "A poll conducted by a leading American polling agency revealed differences in understanding of the background and causes of the 9.11 terrorism between U. S. opinion leaders and those elsewhere." "58% of those asked except in the U. S. answered 'Many people in the world consider U. S. policies gave rise to terrorism,' but only 18% answered so in America." "The reason that America is disliked by other countries" is "because U. S. policies are widening the disparity in wealth among nations." (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 26, 2001, morning ed., p. 2.)

Richard Dawkins' understanding shown in the following quotation comes close to mine that regards the mode of thinking as the basic factor contributing to the 9.11 attacks. He says: 
"[R]eligion is not harmless nonsense, but dangerous nonsense. . . .  It seems to me that, on both sides, the same evil was being revered with neither side realizing that this kind of faith was fundamentally responsible for the attack in the first place." (see article entitled "Civilization in the 21st century/Religion, group affiliation at root of conflicts" in the Daily Yomiuri, January 13, 2002, p. 1; emphasis added).

This article does not intend to discuss appropriateness, and in turn supportability, of particular actions.

Appropriateness of a particular action taken by an actor (e.g. a government) may be discussed from various viewpoints. An action is taken as a means to an end; thus, the desirability of the end (e.g. protection of freedom) and the suitability of the means (e.g. eradication of al Qaeda) to the end are to be examined. An action once actually taken is often accompanied by unintended effects (e.g. involvement of noncombatants in the warfare, the spread of violent acts all over the world, and difficulty in ending military actions once actually launched), and their magnitude is to be examined. In addition, when other intentions (e.g. satisfaction of the emotion of vengeance, and protection or expansion of interests in other countries) are involved in the selection of the action, improper elements from the viewpoint of the first intention may be present in the outcome. Furthermore, appropriateness of an action can not be discussed isolating it from historical accumulation of related events (e.g. repeated wars in the Middle East, the Israeli occupation of those areas including the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the United States' support of Israel).

In consideration of this, I may say the following. When my theoretical standpoint is one which regards a mode of thinking as superior and a government seems to adopt it, I can support it on the whole. However, it does not necessarily mean that I could support every single action (e.g. the military actions taken in Afghanistan by the United States and some of its allies) the government takes.

What this article concerns itself with is a theoretical analysis of conflict situation in general but a practical examination of appropriateness and supportability of a particular action.

The basic framework used here is that of Tanaka's developed in Chapter 1 "Power as a Maximizing Behavior" in Tanaka, Hiroshi, The Economic Theory of the State and Power (Tokyo: Keio Tsushin, 1996; in Japanese).


18 There are no Japanese dictionaries of political science, philosophy, sociology, and so forth, which contain a satisfactory definition of fundamentalism as a "mode of thinking."

General dictionaries define it as follows: Fundamentalism is a "movement or point of view characterized by rigid adherence to fundamental or basic principles" (*American Heritage Dictionary*, 3rd ed.), and "a standpoint to believe that the Scripture is infallible and [its] basic teachings are literally true. . . . The term also applies to tendencies of the same kind in other religions and thoughts" (*Koujien*, 5th ed.).

Not all principles function as the basis for fundamentalism. As it will be mentioned in detail later (IV (4)), only those principles that "specify ways of acting for individuals and modes of activities for groups of individuals, directly or indirectly as a result of specifying the way things are in nature and society," function as such.

Counterposing a fundamentalist and a cosmopolitan, Anthony Giddens says: While the latter "recognizes that there are multiple identities and recognizes the existence of multiple cultures and sees the need for positive dialogue and coexistence between them", a fundamentalist feels "[t]here is only one identity I can have, and there is only one way that I can live my life, and everyone else should get out the way." In addition, Giddens mentions that "you can have ethnic fundamentalism, you can have nationalist fundamentalism, as well as religious fundamentalism. They are all quite dangerous, because they are always ringed with violence. And as you saw in Japan, you often have young people involved who turn fundamentalism into a kind of fanaticism." (See article entitled "Civilization in the 21st century/Third way could offer alternative to obsolete Japanese political ideas" in *the Daily Yomiuri*, January 15, 2002, p. 1; emphasis added).

19 Political systems of dictatorship, despotism and absolutism are manifestations of political fundamentalism.


22 We may say that a mistake is made, when an outcome of a choice of an alternative is later evaluated undesirable by the same chooser for the following reasons: (A) The outcome is what the chooser did not expect when the choice was made, or (B) the chooser's standard for evaluation has been modified since the choice of the previous round. In other words, a mistake in this article denotes an outcome of a choice evaluated undesirable regardless of the reason.

23 To have opportunities for redoing does not necessarily mean that they are actually made use of. If the outcome of the choice of the previous round is satisfactory, people do not utilize their opportunity for redoing in the following round.
24 See the mechanism of coercion in II.

25 Democracy may be defined as follows: It is a design to "guarantee the user (the electorate) of the device (the government) the widest possible opportunities for redoing in its use, after extending as widely as possible the scope of the users among those who are objects (the citizens) of its function" (Negishi, Takeshi, "Opportunities for Trial-And-Error in Politics: Democracy Recast in Simple Ordinary Language," Keio Journal of Politics, No. 5 (1984), pp. 62-63). In the original article, the term "trial-and-error" was used in place of "redoing."

26 There are various ideas, thoughts and research works which assume premises taken as "absolutely" certain. The following are such examples: "Temperature does not fall below absolute zero," and "man as a living thing can not live without oxygen." Premises of this kind do not necessarily raise doubts about the ideas, thoughts and research works which assume them.

27 Without using figurative expressions, the "arena" is an environment for choice which is composed of a set of measures taken to induce individuals to select particular ways of acting. These measures include "coercion" and "provision of false information leading to misunderstanding on the part of those informed." The actual attribute of a particular arena of decision-making is determined by the way particular measures of this kind are either set up or excluded for particular classes of choice. Redoism, as a rule, tries to secure for everyone an environment void of all possible measures of this kind. The actual process of shaping a particular arena, according to the specification, is to be characterized by trial-and-error.

28 See IV (2) i.

29 See the last footnote in chapter I.

30 In redoism "democratization" means provision of conditions for allowing the widest possible scope of people to make selections of governmental activities with the least possible coercion exerted by others. Activities carried out for this purpose are called "movements for democratization."

From the viewpoint of redoism the concept of "human rights" is understood to designate "the minimum set of necessary conditions for an individual to perform redoing." Therefore, human rights can be regarded as an indispensable component of democratization.

One country's support for movements for democratization in other countries, as in the case of the U. S. foreign policy in favor of human rights, may be understood as follows. Theoretically speaking, progress in general has a value acceptable to everyone, and progress in the political sphere is unlikely without a democratic decision-making arena; therefore, removal of actions preventing such an arena from being realized will benefit all including those who took the actions. It seems theoretically likely that governmental activities of one country without a democratic decision-making arena, are inferior in quality to those of others with such an arena (IV (2) ii), thus exert negative influence on the latter. It is natural that the latter countries should try to remove the undesirable influence, and their support for movements for democratization in the former country are considered to be just and necessary as a drastic measure for the removal of the undesirable influence. In this sense one
country's support for movements for democratization in other countries -- which, logically speaking, is a case of interference in the internal affairs of other countries -- is theoretically just and necessary. (This suggests the necessity to review the principle of nonintervention. From the first, it admitted an exception in the case of direct immediate danger brought about by political conflicts in other countries (see Encyclopedia of Political Science (Tokyo: Heibon-Sha, 1954), p. 1029).

U.S. diplomacy in favor of human rights can be justified in this context. It should be kept in mind, however, that activities performed in the name of human rights can be justified by their effect of contributing to the provision of "the minimum set of necessary conditions for redoing" for the people of the countries where intervention has taken place. Thus, the appropriateness of a particular action should be determined on this basis, and with due consideration for its accompanying developments. It is necessary for the side intervening in the name of human rights, prior to simply claiming its rightfulness, to make known to the world that redoism as a mode of thinking, on the basis of which the diplomacy in favor of human rights is justified, has a value acceptable to everyone and that the conception of human rights in redoism has a likelihood of cross-cultural acceptance.

31 When a member of a tennis club is not satisfied with the way the club is run, he or she can organize a new one by himself or herself.

32 Harm to the minority interests can not theoretically occur, if the government performs only such activities that equally benefit all members of a nation. In the reality of politics, however, the government performs beyond this limit. Analyses of this subject matter lead to the distinction between what activities the government should perform and what it should not.

33 The movement for independence of East Timor is an example of the redefinition claim.

34 If a redefinition movement aims at democracy, the scopes of the nationals (objects of governmental activities) and those franchised (users of the device called a "government") are theoretically identical and hoped to be so in real politics. Therefore, the majority and minority in the discussion above may be conceived in terms of either the former or the latter.

35 If the premise consists of the words of a god, the principle must be singular, and its meaning must be unequivocally agreed upon. It is inconsistent that there is more than one religion and various sects in a religion. This is proof that human mental faculty secretly acts using the name of god.

If the principle assumed as the premise is a product of human thought, it can not escape from the possibility of being a mistake and its infallibility can not be claimed.

36 What is discussed here is how the decision-making process should be organized. Regardless of the actual use or nonuse of coercion in this process, the use of coercion is indispensable once a decision is made on governmental activities and they are to be performed.

37 Examples of such words are "ugliness" and "stupidity."
See article entitled "The War Against Terrorism -- A Pretext for Political Oppression" (Yomiuri Shimbun, February 11, 2002, morning ed., p. 15). It reported that there developed a vicious tendency, since the 9.11 attacks, to easily justify any policies in the name of anti-terrorism. Examples listed are treatment of antigovernment groups in the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region by the Chinese Government, the movements for independence in Chechen by the Russian Government, and the Palestinian Authority by Israel.

In regard to this, the following definitions of "terrorism" are clear-cut. American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd ed., defines it as the "unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons," and Koujien, 5th ed., defines it as "the tendency to resort to violence or its threat, for political purposes." Terrorism differs from a mere use of violence (physical force exerted to injure the human body); the former functions as a means for forcing a particular government to perform particular activities. The use or threatened use of violence itself is not an end but a means to force acceptance of political demands of the violent attacker.


This tendency had a conspicuous effect in the United Nations' discussion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. In October 2001 the discussion broke down over the definition of terrorism, a "gateway" matter. Islamic countries, in opposition to the United States, maintained that the military actions by the Palestinians for self-determination are to be excluded from terrorism, and that the attacks by the Israeli regular army are to be included. (Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 2001, morning ed., p. 3).

Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 2002, morning ed., p. 7. This article also points out a feeling among the Israeli people: "Why do they criticize Israel while disregarding the terrorism of Arafat?"

On April 13, 2002 under confinement imposed by the Israeli troops, Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority acknowledged the suicide bombings as "terrorism," but at the same time resolutely condemned the Israeli actions in Jenin and Nablus as "state terrorism" (Asahi Shimbun, April 14, 2002, morning ed., p. 3). A statement issued on September 23, 2001 by the Gulf Cooperation Council held in Cairo urged "the various world powers not to let preoccupation with current events cause them to ignore the state terrorism exercised by the Israeli government against the Palestinian people" (see web page entitled "2001 News September and October: GCC Foreign Ministers Support Anti-Terrorism Efforts, September 23, 2001" at http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/archive/01_news5.htm). Syrian Foreign Minister Shallah at a European Union/Mediterranean Conference meeting held in November 2001 made a remark to the effect that the Israeli actions constitute "state terrorism" against the Palestinian people (Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 2001, morning ed., p. 7). At an Organization of Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers' special meeting on terrorism held in Malaysia in April 2002, shortly after the large-scale suicide bombing on March 27 in Netanya which seriously worsened the situation, a declaration was issued condemning all forms of terrorism including what the delegates called "state terrorism" by Israel, while many of them argued that Palestinian suicide bombers are not terrorists (see web page entitled "World: Islamic Conference Fails To Define 'Terrorism,' Condemns Israel" at
The consensus on the definition of terrorism can not be reached by specifying its characteristics as an act. *Patterns of Global Terrorism,* the annual report on terrorism published by the U. S. Government (the latest version released in May 2002), has employed such a definition of terrorism as an act since 1983, but admits that "[n]o one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance" ("Definition" in "Preface and Introduction" of the report).

The following are listed as the characteristics of terrorism. However, it seems hardly possible to reach a consensus on the basis of them.

A tentative definition of terrorism -- to sum up, any act that causes, by any means, death or serious injury to any person or major economic loss (see web page for "Draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism: Working document submitted by India" at http://www.sisde.it/Sito/Rivista20.nsf/ServNavig/17) -- was prepared for the United Nations, but the discussion broke down in October 2001 without reaching a consensus on specifically what to designate as terrorism (Asahi Shimbun, October 28, 2001, morning ed., p. 3).

Peter Sloterdijk enumerates "four characteristics useful for definition of terrorism;" they are "attacking the defense network of the enemy force not from the front but from the flank," "making surprise attacks," "making a general feeling of unrest grow" by the use of mass media, and acting simply as the user, but not as the producer, of the terrorist weapons (Peter Sloterdijk, "The Indices of Modern Terrorism," in Nakayama, Gen, ed. and trans., Speaking Out -- The 9.11 Terrorist Attacks and Twenty-Three Thinkers (Tokyo: Asahi Publishing Co., 2002), pp. 171-174). However, the first instance of the use of poison gas by the German troops against the French troops on the front line, which Sloterdijk calls "the birth of modern terrorism," is not regarded as terrorism according to the criteria suggested by the above-mentioned U. S. annual report.

The report defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Here, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty." ("Definition" in "Preface and Introduction" of the report).

U. S. Secretary of State Powell in his Senate Testimony of October 25, 2001 admitted that a clear definition of terrorism is not possible in all areas, and acknowledged the necessity of judgment in those areas where "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." And, he specified the following as the yardsticks; whether political grievances can not be expressed other than through violent acts, and whether people are fighting for the kind of rights and values the Americans believe in, suggesting that they respect human rights and democracy. (See web page entitled "The International Campaign against Terrorism: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress" at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:75947.pdf). In contrast, Islamic countries, in opposition to countries in Europe and America, in the discussion of a U. N. comprehensive convention on international terrorism demanded that actions based on the right of self-determination should be excluded from terrorism (Asahi Shimbun, October 27, 2001, morning ed., p. 6).

An article in Asahi Shimbun (October 27, 2001, morning ed., p. 6) reported that "Israeli Prime Minister Sharon came to deliberately call Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority a 'terrorist.' He ingeniously justifies the Israeli invasion into the Palestinian territories, giving the..."
impression that the Authority 'has abandoned peace negotiations, and is no more different from those Islamic extremists who repeatedly carry out suicide bombings.' From this we may learn the intention in using the label of "terrorism."

46 In redoism, actual selection of governmental activities in the decision-making arena thus secured is totally left to the free will of individuals acting in the arena. Therefore, no use of violence, intending to direct the government to perform activities other than creation, maintenance or defense of the democratic decision-making arena, is justified.

47 Use 2 cannot be isolated from use 1.

48 Obstinate smokers are understood to, consciously or unconsciously, overestimate today's benefits gained from smoking while losses to be incurred by possible future diseases are underestimated in their calculation of the loss and gain among sets of alternatives and their concomitants. Here, the emotion of "unwillingness to face up to reality" is working. However, when they get ill later, they, too, with few exceptions regret and deplore the unsoundness of their past choices.

49 "Objectification of the self" is the mental faculty to "externalize one's own thoughts and actions and view them from a viewpoint detached from oneself." "Cognitive flexibility" is the mental faculty to "accept different understandings and opinions of others without distortion, and flexibly modify, if necessary, one's own thoughts and actions after examining them in relation to those different understandings and opinions of others." (See Chapter 4 of Se, Teruhisa, "The Political Institutions of Fallibilistic Liberalism," doctoral dissertation presented to Keio University, Tokyo, Japan in 2000.)

50 The faculty of logical thinking can be acquired by training, or through education. As for the acquirement of the mental faculties of objectification of the self and cognitive flexibility, it is necessary to ensure "intermediate communities characterized by intimate relations, a public education system, and a child welfare system aimed at maintenance of such a living standard that assures a favorable home environment for children." (See Chapter 5 of Se's dissertation above.)

51 In consideration of the ever widening extent of outward influence of governmental activities.

52 If measures are taken without the consent, they come close to occupation administration or colonial rule. They contain elements beyond the intended effect, and can not be justified at all.

53 See A. Giddens' comment in footnote [1] of III.

54 "Facing famine and being confronted by death in domestic warfare, people have nothing to do with either freedom or democracy. What they urgently need is assurance of survival tomorrow and an adequate supply of food. . . ." Shiono Nanami's comment (Yomiuri Shimbun, January 4, 2002, morning ed., p. 1).
The level of living mentioned in footnote [3] is higher than that of subsistence.

If measures are taken without consent, they come close to occupation administration or colonial rule. They contain elements beyond the intended effect, and can not be justified at all.

Redoism considers it just and necessary that creation, maintenance or defense of the arena for selection of one's own specific ways of acting should be conducted to make it so that "the element of coercion be removed as thoroughly as possible, and the opportunity for redoing be fully secured for everyone" (see IV (4)). The measures to provide the social arrangements discussed in IV and VII may be classified as follows in relation to the opportunity for redoing.

[Measures 1]
Those measures that directly enlarge or curtail the opportunity for redoing; manipulation of the shape of the decision-making arena itself.

1. Creation of the arena: movements for democratization (IV (4)), and claims for redefinition of the decision-making body (IV (5)).

2. Maintenance of the arena: improvement of conditions (education, intermediate communities, and the family budget) for development of thinking faculties (VII (1) i), prevention of suspension of thinking (establishment of the political system of the separation of religion and politics) (VII (1) ii), and assurance of conditions for redoing (provision of the domestic safety net and economic aid to developing countries) (VII (3)).

3. Defense of the arena: removal of coercion or protection of freedom (IV (2) i), and eradication of terrorism by the use of military force (IV (4)).

[Measures 2]
Those measures that do not directly enlarge or curtail the opportunity for redoing; provision of preconditions for manipulation of the decision-making arena.

4. Guarantee of living (maintenance of law and order, and assurance of access to foodstuffs) (VII (2)).

A Muslim is not synonymous with a fundamentalist.

The September 24, 2001 issue of Newsweek reported that "Americans want vengeance now" as the first line (p. 40) of an article entitled "How to Strike Back." Redoism has no logical connection with vengeance.

On March 27, 2002 in Netanya, a northern city in Israel, a suicide bombing by a Palestinian killed 20 people (Asahi Shimbun, March 28, 2002, evening ed., p. 1). In the face of this, Prime Minister Sharon of Israel declared a war against terrorism, and opened attacks with the use of armed force in the Palestinian territories (Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 2002, morning ed., p. 7). This suddenly and seriously worsened the situation.
61 In the Declaration of Independence of Palestine of November 15, 1988, the Palestine National Council (the PLO's highest decision-making body considered to be the parliament of all Palestinians) declared "the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine". The declaration made it clear that the State of Palestine shall have, among others, "a democratic parliamentary system based on freedom of opinion and the freedom to form parties". Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority, at a Palestine Legislative Council meeting held on May 15, 2002 in Ramallah, stated that he would carry out a comprehensive review of the government and emphasized that the political system is established "on the basis of democracy" (see web page entitled "Address of H.E. Yasser Arafat, President of the State of Palestine, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the Palestine National Authority, at the Palestine Legislative Council" at http://www.palestineaffairscouncil.org/address_of_h1.htm). Furthermore, on May 29, 2002 Chairman Arafat signed the Basic Law (considered to be the Constitution of the Palestinian Authority) which provides for freedoms of speech, association and so forth (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 31, 2002, morning ed., p. 7). [There are some groups, though in the minority, that aim at the establishment of undemocratic systems. They are ignored here; reference to them will be made later.]

62 Israel has no written constitution in one single document, but rather a number of Basic Laws. "Basic Law: The Knesset" provides, as in a typical democracy, that the parliament of the State (the Knesset) shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, granting Israeli nationals of eighteen or over the right to vote and nationals of twenty-one or over the right to be elected, and decide by a majority of those participating in the voting (Basic Law: The Knesset (1987), Sections 4, 5, 6 and 25). And, Section 7a of the same basic law provides that a candidates' list to the Knesset, if its objects or actions, expressly or by implication, include "negation of the democratic character of the State", shall not participate in elections. Furthermore, "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1994)" describes Israel as "a Jewish and democratic state" (Section 1a).

63 There are some people on the Palestinian side, though in the minority, who employ the fundamentalists' mode of thinking, thus justifying suicide bombings. It is natural that their activities should not be recognized as movements for democratization.

64 At present, Israel justifies its military actions as "self-defense" against terrorism carried out by the Palestinian side. However, the Israeli people do not have a totally negative attitude to the idea of coexistence of the two States. "An opinion poll found that more than seventy percent of [the Israeli] people responded in favor of resumption of negotiations for the establishment of the State of Palestine when terrorism ends." (See Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 2002, morning ed., p. 7.)