"RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF CORRUPTION-Acts of the International Conference Milan, 19-20 November 1999-" United nation Publication, 2000



Hisao Katoh*



Criminal policy can be divided into hard criminal policy and soft criminal policy. This is the so-called bifurcation in penal policy described by Professor Bottoms 194 .

The hard criminal policy should be used for serious crimes and maintained in the constitution, if we want to maintain a legal system and a state based on the rule of law, and to guarantee the rights of victims. On the other hand, the soft crimin'1l policy will be vet-y effective for minor offences. Under this criminal policy various alternative penal sanctions should be applied and discussed under such categories as diversion programs, de-criminalisation theory and non-intervention theory." 195 This paper is based on exactly these points of view.

If the state is to control power over penal sanctions, the ultima ratio principle of penal sanctions should be always considered and observed. l96

And in criminal policy, a balance between the rights of offenders and of victims should also be considered. If anything, offenders have played an important role in the classical theory of criminal policy while the position of victims has been often forgotten in the practice of criminal justice.

In the early 1980s the labeling theory seriously influenced criminal policy and the system of penal sanctions in many countries. At the same time, rehabilitative ideas disappeared in the USA and Scandinavian countries, but continued to play an important role in Japan and Western European countries. As a concrete example of the application of hard criminal policy, I would like to discuss the problem of organized crime groups, known as Yakuza or Boryokudan in Japan. I would

* Head of Criminal Law and Medical Law, Law Faculty, Keio University, Japan.

l94 Hisao Katoh, "Alternative Penal Sanctions in Japan". Japanese Reports for the XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, Athens, 1994, pp. 229-237; A. Bottoms, "Reflections on the Renaissance of Dangerousness'', Howard Journal of Penology, XVI. 1977, pp.70-96.

195 Hisao Katoh, Alternative Penal Sanction s in Japan, Japanese Reports For the XIVth International Congress or Comparative Law, Athens, 1994, pp. 229-237; H. Katoh, "The Development Of Delinqucncy and Criminal Justice in Japan", in H.G. Heiland, L. Shelley and l1. Katoh (Eds.), Crime and Control in Comparative Perspectives, 1992. Pp. 69-81.

l96 Hisao Katoh. ''Alternative Penal Sanctions in Japan", Japanese Reports for lhe XIVlh International Congress of Comparative Law, Athens, 1994, pp.229-237


Particularly like to discuss the problem of the cozy relationship between politicians, financiers and members of the organized crime groups. Among these crimes, I will focus on the crime of sokaiyas who are almost all members of Boryokudan (Yakuza

= Organized crime group). 197

As you know, the recent financial and political crisis in Japan Was triggered by a criminal case involving a member of a sokaiya corporate extortionist group, Ryuichi Koike (who was sentenced to a nine months or imprisonment without a suspension and to a fine of approximately 7 million yen, on 21 April 1999 by the Tokyo district court). It is clear from his political career that the present Prime Minister is not an exception. In other words, like earlier Prime Ministers, he also is not very clean. If I were to state my conclusion right at the beginning, I would say that, fundamentally, we have to change the political structure of the Liberal Democratic Party (the governing party) and the nature of money broking politics, which can be blamed for the corruptions of politicians. Most importantly, we should not elect such corrupt politicians at the next election.

Structural corruption of politicians and the Japanese system of government

Corruption of Diet-members

We will never able to forget the Lockheed type scandal of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Quite recently, the newspapers reported that former Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami, who was also involved in this scandal, was found guilty. l98 But he declared that he would keep his Lower House seat - at least for the moment - even though he has quit the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

In its ruling, the court has rejected an appeal by the Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker against the three-year prison term, suspended for four years, and 42.7 million Yen fine imposed on him by the Tokyo High Court.

Fujinami was accused of accepting monetary gifts, while he was Chief Cabinet Secretary; in order to use his power to prevent the bureaucracy from hiring university graduates before the private sector. The journal Recruit, which publicizes job information, was concerned that the bureaucracy's pre-emptive snatching up of new recruits would cause businesses to disregard a gentlemen's agreement that existed in the industrial sector to commence recruitment simultaneously. Recruit feared that if this agreement broke down, job seekers would no longer found

197 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, 2nd Edition (l988) and 4th Edition (l994). Pp. 251-255. Brian Woodall. Japan. Under Construction. Corporation. Politics, and Public Works, 1996.

l98 E. Kaplan and A. Dubro, Yakuza, the Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269.


useful to purchase the journal. Hiromasa Ezoe, the former chairman of Recruit who is now facing court charges for paying brides, is accused of having visited Fujinami in March 1984 to ask him to put pressure on ministries to hire people in accordance with the gentlemen's agreement.

In August and December of the same year he handed him two checks worth 5 million yen each. Another 10 million in checks were paid to Fujinami the next year following similar requests and, in September 1986, Fujinami received 10,000 unlisted shares in Recruit Cosmos, which he sold the next month for a gain of 22.7 million yen. (Asahi Evening News (22 October 1999) reported:

It is true that the corruption of politicians is also a kind of white-collar crime. I would like to introduce an interesting case on this subject. Asahi Evening News (24 September l992) reported:

Watanabe and late gangster leader Susumu Ishii, who are involved in the ongoing Tokyo Sagawa scandal, were also said to have been involved behind the scene in stopping rightist's attack on LDP bigwig Shin Kanamaru following his trip to North Korea in 1990. The incidents of such connections lead us to suspect other hidden connections between politicians and YAKUZA. The gap between the political front stage and the background scenery seems so great. New generation rightist leader, Shusuke Nomura (who later committed suicide in the Asahi Newspaper Co.) said, in describing the politician-gangster relationship: 'Politicians today have no long-term vision of the nation but are wrapped up instead in expanding their factions within the party. They need a lot of cash for this from underground sources and this leads to their forming connections with outlaws.

And as an interesting case of the corruption of a politician, Asahi News Service (8

March l994) reported:

Nakamura's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in power and an influential 'Kensetsu-zoku' (both a protector and beneficiary of the construction and Construction Ministry), who eventually became Construction Minister. The tie that bands powerful national politicians, bureaucrats and businesses held sway over the edoken-kokka' (a state dominated by contractors). The essence of scandals by general contractors lies in the systematic collusion that has been in place for so many years. It is very significant that the prosecution has taken a scalpel to those collusive relations.


Tax evasion by politicians

Income tax crimes have been on tile increase since the early 1960s,while corporate tax law violations have also risen since tile late 1950s.The late 1980s and early 1990s registered the record number of violations of income tax and accession tax laws, because of the increased number of false surety obligation cases through tax evasion contractors. In 1993,the number of corporation tax law violators was as high as 350,resulting from the "Bubble EconomyH-t11erapideconomic growth experienced by Japan around that time. 199

Toshiki Inamura, former Director-General of tile Environment Agency, charged with evading mol-e than 1 billion yen in taxes and failing to report an income of about 2.8 billion yen, money he had made from stock trading-He received a sentence of 3 years and 4 months imprisonment without a suspension, in addition to a 300 million yen fine for violating the income tax law. It was also determined that, should he be unable to pay these fines in full, he would be detained in a workhouse for three years. (Article 18 of the Pena l Code).

A symbolic crime of money politics

In July 1999, in a very famous criminal case considered a symbolic crime of money politics, a defendant was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment without suspension and filled to 10 million yen for buying votes, fraud and accepting bribes. The defendant appealed against this verdict to the district court.

The Tokyo District Court described the former lawmaker, Yojiro Nakajima (38) who was former parliamentary vice minister of the Defense Agency, as 'grave and a plutocrat, Nakajima admitted receiving 5 million yen in brides from Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. In 1996. In exchange, Nakajima used his influence as vice parliamentary defense minister to give the company a share in the procurement of a new type of rescue seaplane, the ruling said.

Nakajima's grandfather founded Fuji Heavy Industries. He also confessed to paying an Ota Assembly member 20 million yen to gather votes in the Lower House election in 1996 ? a violation of the public offices election law. In addition, Nakajima was indicted on charge of falsely reporting political subsidies received from the central government and submitting another false report on political funds. These acts constitute violation of

199 White Paper on Crime, 1997,p.9.


the political donations law and political funds control law. (Asahi evening News, 14 July 1999) 200

The political funds control law and its huge loopholes

The reform of this law is currently being discussed by the Japanese Parliament, because political contribution from companies is mainly to blame for structural corruption. For example,

Former Prime Minister, Morihiro Hosokawa, received contributions from the scandal-affected Sagawa Kyubin corporate group, totaling 19 million yen in 1990 and 1991. He took care to keep each receipt below the amount required under the Political Funds Control Law to be reported as political donations. Hosokawa, who has admitted to receiving funds from the Sagawa transportation group, submitted documents on the contributions in response to demands from the opposition ? the Liberal Democratic Party ad the Japanese Communist Party ? to make public records of his fund sources. He was later arrested and indicated for massive income tax evasion. Under the current Political Funds Control Law, a politicians is not required to report receipt of contributions from a single corporation as long as the amount paid to the politician' political organization amounts to less than 1.5 million yen per years for each group. The name of the contributing corporation must be made public, however when the amount exceeds 1 million yen. Former LPD kingpin, Shin Kanamaru, resigned as party Vice president in August 1992, after having received 500 million yen from Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin Co. He was arrested and indicted for massive income tax evasion. Although Hosokawa's acceptance of contribution is not illegal, observers have suggested that Hosokawa may have tried to hide the money received from the scandal-tainted Sagawa group by having each Sagawa group company pay in small sums so that none of the amounts were reported to the authorities. This method, whereby politicians have a number of political and fundraising organization to which contributions are made by corporations in small amounts, is a well-known practice in Japan's political world. (Asahi evening News, 24 September 1993) 201

200 Paul Heywood (Ed.), Political corruption, 1997; David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza, the Explosive Account of Japan's Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269; Brian Woodall, Japan under Construction, Politics and Public Works, 1996.

201 David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza, the Explosive Account of Japan's Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269; Claire Sterling, Thieves 'World. The threat of the new Global Network of Organized Crime, 1994; Brian Woodall, Japan under Construction, Politics and Public Works, 1996.


Overcoming hereditary and money politics

Although Japan has been under effective one-party rule for most of the last 40 years, it has developed a form of "democracy" which puts economic improvement firmly at the top of its political aims and targets. The Japanese parliament, or Diet, now Consists of an upper house (the House of Councilors) with 252 members, and a lower house (House of Representatives) with 500 members. A general election is usually held every four years. Although, according to the Constitution, the Diet is the supreme law-making body, the civil service elite have operated some of the main levers of power, drafted laws and run the economy. And the Party, which has monopolized government, has developed close co-operation with political and business leaders-the so-called "iron triangle".

The adversarial politics, which is typical of Western democracies, has become less common in Japan and the confrontations of the 1960s have been smoothed away by economic success. Consensus is the norm and traditional hierarchies still wield enormous power. The iron triangle was widely accepted while Japan's economy enjoyed its spectacular 52-year growth after 1947, but has come under increasing pressure since the collapse of the "bubble economy" in 1992. Under a new electoral system introduced in 1994, 300members of tile lower house are elected by a single seat "first-past-the-post" system, while 200 members are elected on the basis of party choice by proportional representation. This system was introduced because the old multi-seat constituencies had led to competitive vote buying even among factions of tile same party. Seats are often handed down to the next generation. In the 1993 election, 24.8% of elected members inherited seats from relatives (or family); for the LDP, the figure was 41 .4%. The LDP is divided into factions. Such political practices of the LDP traditionally entrench vested interests and make reform difficult to achieve.

As I said above, behind governmental corruption there is a problem of tile second generation Diet man and a government that has bee monopolized for most of the last 40 years by a single party, the LDP.

Just as the father of John F. Kennedy had a very close relationship with the Chicago Mafia, the father, brother and relatives of the second generation Diet man had a more or less cozy relationship with the Boryokudans (organized crime groups or Yakuza) . 202

202 John H. Davis, Mafia kingfish Carlos Marcello and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, 1989, Martin short, Crime INC., 1984.


For many years, politicians have routinely talked about political shares, when referring the shares, which were rumored to have been bought and sold most heavily by factions in the LDP at the time of the election of its pre sident. 203

Such practices create money politics. It is the main culprit behind Corruption and cozy relationships between politicians and organized crime groups.

Cozy relationship between corporate groups, sokaiya and gangsters

What is sokaiya?

Sokaiyas are certain individuals or groups of individuals (often called professional stock-holders) who sell "protection" services to companies, Ostensibly to prevent disruption at annual shareholders' meetings. They attend shareholders' meetings because they generally own a small amount of the company's stock and can threaten disruption themselves if their monetary requests are not met. The recent changes in Japan's Commercial Code, which intended to bring the sokaiyas under control, seem to have produced little effect. Instead, more and more top companies have resorted to holding their annual shareholders, meetings on the same day in Order to make it impossible for the sokaiyas to attend a large number of company meetings. Despite this strategy, it has proved impossible to fully remove the influence of these elements because of their intimidation skills, and the sokaiyas continue to represent a source of embarrassment and a problem for Japan in this era of supposedly rational, global capital markets.

The famous American journalists Caplan and Dubro define the sokaiya as "General Meeting Mongers". Japan's underworld showcase of extortion, however, is not in the water business (mi-zu-sho-bai), or even in the sarakin. It thrives among a remarkably brazen, professional class of corporate racketeers whose activities have traditionally centered around the company shareholders' meeting: the sokaiya.

The word translates directly as shareholders' but the sokaiya gangs have been variously described in English as financial mongers, black gentlemen in the shadow, and rent-a-thugs. 204

And Company racketeering also involves gangsters and sokaiya racketeers (also newspaper racketeers and company racketeers) as well as other racketeers who claim to work for a social or political cause. These groups intervene in corporate activity and, with the backing of Boryokudan collect money unjustifiably in the

203 AEN, 20 February 1998.

204 E.Kaplan and A.Dubro, Yakuza, the Explosive Account of Japan's Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269; Claire Sterling, Thieves 'World. The threat of the new Global Network of Organized Crime, 1994.


Name of exercising shareholders' rights and conducting social and political activities. 205

An example of as Sokaiya- Ryuichi Koike

Here, I would like to introduce a number of other Interesting cases . As I said above, the recent financial and political crisis in Japan began with a Sokaiya, Ryuichi Koike.

The Asahi Shimbun newspaper (12 April 1997) reported that, according to well placed sources, a sokaiya racketeer-related company that had been a special client of Nomura Securities Co. posted a huge profit of more than 500 million yen in the 1993 fiscal year at a time when the Japanese stock market was nose-diving. Nomura, the nation's largest securities company, was suspected of managing funds of politicians, bureaucrats and other important clients through exclusive "VIP accounts" which were only given to special clients.

The Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Committee opened inves tigations last month against Nomura and its executives who were suspected of violating the Commercial Law and the securities Exchange Law. Meanwhile, i t was also revealed that Ryuichi Koike had owned a huge amount of stock in all four major Japanese security companies- Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, Yamauchi ? since February 1989. The sokaiya racketeer owned 300,000 shares in each of the securities company, or a total of 1.3million shares. And recently, the Tokyo police said they had arrested two corporate racketeer suspected of extorting millions of yen from Japan Airlines (JAL). The Metropolitan Police Department identified the suspects as Hitoshi Ogasawara, aged 51, a senior member of a sokaiya group called Morimoto Kigyo Chosakai, and Mamoru Arai, aged 53, president of Taihei, a potted plant rental company known to have close ties with the sokaiyas. Ogasawara was also the boss of a gang affiliated with the underworld syndicate, Sumiyoshi-kais. They were arrested on suspicion of violating the commercial law. The two men were suspected of receiving 22.8million yen from the airline between November 1995 and May 1999.The money was Ostensibly paid in the form of plant rental fees, but police said they believe the funds were in exchange for an agreement not to disrupt the airlines shareholders meetings. Police said they suspected the airline had paid about 80 million to the sokaiya since 1990.

205 White Paper on Police, 1993, p.10


Corruption of financiers

On 27 October 1999, Kenichi Sueno, the former head of a real estate firm that went bankrupt with debts of more than l trillion yen, was sentenced to four years of imprisonment and fined 35 million yen for concealing company assets to escape debt repayments (AEN). According to the ruling, Kenichi Sueno , in conspiracy with three other defendants, set up 18 dummy companies in succession to hide company assets so that he could avoid repaying huge debts. He also transferred the ownership of nine real estates, such as parking lots and buildings, from Sueno Kosan to the dummy companies. The transfers were made so that Sueno Kosan would not have to surrender assets to the mortgage firms.

Countermeasures for the eradication of organized crime groups

Countermeasures for the eradication of Boryokudan

Traditionally, the police crackdowns on gangs (organized crime groups) have emphasized three elements: "persons", "monies" and "goods". "Persons" mean large-scale, repeated roundups of gangsters, "monies" refer to strict control on the economic activities of organized crime groups, and "goods" refer to the regulation of firearms, drugs, pornography and women as of trade, prostitution, etc. 206

According to the 1998 White Paper on Police, Boryokudan's economic crimes increased after the collapse of the bubble economy.

According to investigations of Boryokudan crimes involving bad loans, in 1996, Boryokudan's crimes involving the collection of debts stood out against a backdrop of the post-bubble economic situation. Police cleared 55 cases of offences perpetrated by Boryokudan organizations in connection with bad loans. This figure represents a significant increase compared with the previous year. 207

Boryokudan forces are also committing various forms of crime under the guise of corporate activities (Boryokudan front companies) 208 in order to raise founds. 209

206 H.Katoh "Prohibition of Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime Groups (Yakuza or Boryokudan) in Japan", Keio Law Review, N0.7, 1994, pp.21-41; Howard Abadinsky. 0rgrillized Crime, 2nd Edition (1988) and 4 th Edition (1994), pp.251-255; Brian Woodall, Japan. Under Construction, corruption, Politics and Public Works, 1996.

207 White Paper on Police, 1993, p.174.

208 Boryokudan front companies are companies established and controlled by Boryokudan, or by associate Boryokudan members, which provide funds to Boryokudan and co-operate in maintaining and operating Boryokudan organizations.

209 H.katoh, "Prohibition of Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime Groups (Yakuza or Boryokudan) in Japan", Keio Law Review, N0.7, 1994, pp.21-41; E. David Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza, the Explosive Account of Japan's Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269; Christopher Seymour, The Yakuza Diary; Doing Time in the Japanese Underworld, 1996


In 1997, there were 213 cleared cases of crimes committed by Boryokudan's front companies, seven more than in the previous year. They involved a total of 234 companies of these cleared cases, 139 were committed by 153 front companies affiliated with Yamaguchi-gumi, each accounting for nearly 60% of the total. Twenty-five of tile 213 cases cleared were for extortion, followed by fraud (22 cases) and violations of tile Manpower Dispatching Business Law (21 cases). 210

Of the 251 corporations involved, seventy-six were construction firms, 30 real-estate companies and 29 were food and catering firms.

Stopping money laundering

What is money laundering?

The Japanese White Paper on Police (1991) defines money laundering as "a process which draws a veil over the illicit sources of funds raised from criminal acts including unlawful drug traffic by means of passing them through financial institutions under tile guise of legal income". 211

Drug crime syndicates, which obtain immense profits from unlawful drug trafficking, need to conceal the traces of income obtained from criminal acts and convert the money into clean funds in order to avoid an investigation into the profits. For that purpose, they try to draw a veil over the illicit sources of profits and their real owners by making deposits in fictitious accounts, purchasing monetary commodities and transferring funds among various accounts.

Measures to Prevent money laundering of Boryokudan crimes

Generally speaking, the Japanese Government and legislature are easily influenced by international opinion, pressure and criticism. For example, the 1991 Drug Control Law was also influenced by tile so-called Law Concerning Special provisions for Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control, etc. and other

210 White Paper on Police, 1998, p.76.

211 H.katoh, "Prohibition of Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime Groups (Yakuza or Boryokudan) in Japan", Keio Law Review, N0.7, 1994, pp.21-41; White Paper on Police, 1998, N ational Police Agency Government of Japan; Richard Alexander, "EU: the EC Money Laundering Directive", J. Money Laundering Control, Vol-2.No.l, 1998,pp. 68-73;Schaap, Cees: Fighting Money Laundering. With Comments on the Legislations of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, 1998.


laws. The Japanese Government also ratified the Vienna Convention as early as June 1991. Personally, I was very disappointed with this new law, because its provision regarding money laundering only apply to the acts related to the proceeds and properties made from illegal drug trafficking. My opinion is that the problem of this money laundering should not be limited to drug-related offences. For instance, as far as I know, in many countries which have introduced these money laundering prohibitions, such as the USA, Canada, Italy, France, Switzerland and Germany, prerequisite offences are not limited to drug offences. Of course, during the drafting of tile law in Japan there was heated debate as to whether prerequisite offences of money laundering should be expanded or not. I think it should be expanded and that it should, in particular, apply to all organized crimes. I have been arguing that the new law against Boryokudans should introduce the system of freezing assets and the forfeiture of illicit proceeds and properties.

Taking away the tribute money paid to Boryokudans

The illegal money and profits made by Boryokudans now within their own organizations. The money made by the lower-ranking members flow into the pockets of the boss or leader of their organized group. There are two types of money flow.

Tribute money

This money is usually called Jonokin (tribute) and is offered to the upper echelon (bosses or leaders) of the organized groups every month. This tribute money is paid by the under-boss to the head of the organization. The police estimate that several hundreds of millions of yen in cash are funneled to top leaders every month.

Fund raising activities by lower ranking gangsters

The lower ranking members of the groups have to pay tributes to their own bosses. Therefore, they eke out a living with the help of their wives, mistresses and/or boss, also sometimes by doing part-time work. The burden of having to pay tribute money is so great that sometimes the lower ranking members commit suicide, something that was accentuated after tile enforcement of the new Anti-Boryokudan Law, which has restricted their fund raising activities.

On the other hand, the bosses live off the tribute money, as well to maintain and run their organizations, provide entertainment and buy gifts. This siphoning of funds from the lower ranking members means that the top echelon members do not have to commit crimes and can instead lead luxurious lives and own expensive foreign cars and elegant houses in fashionable residential areas. This is an incredibly high lifestyle in the eyes of ordinary citizens or taxpayers-Boryokudan


gangs, regardless of their ostensible aims, carry out their activities and use their organized power to guarantee their leaders a luxurious life based on tribute money.

Tax evasion by the Boryokudan

As is well known, Al Capone-the reputed kingfisher of the Chicago underworld ? was finally arrested and sent to jail on tax evasion. After 7 years of imprisonment, he returned to the Chicago underworld but lost his power as kingfisher. 212

Therefore, we should not overlook the tax evasions by Boryokudan, which have to be tightly cracked down. We call use strict control to deprive them of their illegal profits.

Some proposal and conclusion

I do not know whether the politicians are the chicken or whether the Yakuza members are the egg. But if we want to dissolve the cozy relationship existing between them, we have to overcome our bad habit of acknowledging such crooked politicians and gangsters and continuing to employ them. And the most important consideration might be to suggest concrete countermeasures and criminal policy against corruption and organized crime.

Enforcement of the Anti-Boryokudan Law

Regretfully, the new Anti-Boryokudan Law has two major weak points. One is the abuse of an article regarding the Anti-Boryokudan Law, and the other is the absence of any article dealing with confiscation of illegal income.

Introduction of tile article regarding control of violent groups

As at the end of 1997, there were approximately 80,100 regular and associate Boryokudan members, representing an increase of about 200 (0.3%) over the previous year. With this new law against the Boryokudans the police cannot order such criminal organizations to be dissolved. Therefore, we have an incredible situation whereby, despite the fact that the Japanese police have a good grasp of the situation and information about these groups, they are cannot do anything.

A special Violent Groups Control Act should be prepared as soon as possible, like that contained in the German, French and Italian Penal Codes. Thus, for example,

212 Jay R.Nash, World Encyclopedia of Organized Crime, 1993; Laurence Bergree, Capone: the man and the era, Simon & Schuster, 1994.


Section 129 (Formation of Criminal Associations) of the German Penal Code establishes that:

(1) Whoever forms an association the objectives or activities of which are directed toward the commission of criminal acts or whoever participates in such an association as a member, solicits for it or supports it, will be punished by imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or by a fine.

Introduction of the article regarding the confiscation of illegal income

Although this new Anti-Boryokudan Law also has no article providing for the confiscation of illegal income, the new Anti Organized Crime Law (1999) has introduced an article providing for this.

Approval of the Anti Organized Crime Law

On 8 August l999, three bills aimed at fighting Organized crime, including controversial legislation that would allow authorities to use wire-taps and intercept communications on the Internet, were approved. These wiretaps will be allowed only in cases involving murder, drug offences, human smuggling and weapons.

The other bills are aimed at preventing money laundering and increasing protection for witnesses.

Regretfully, this law has also no article as the German Penal Code (Section 129: Formation of Criminal Associations).

Setting up an International Information and Network for the Eradication of Organized Crime Groups and Offences

From my research in 13 countries, have learned that it is very important to understand and analyze the situation of organized crimes from an international perspective. 213

213 United States, The Impact: Organized Crime Today. President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1986: United States Senate, Organized Crime: 25 Years after Valachi, Hearings of Committee on Governmental affairs, April 11-29, 1988; Leyendecker/Ickelmann/Boenisch, Mafia im Staat: Deutschland faell unter die Raeuber, Steidl, 1992: Punch, Maurice et al. (Eds.), Coping with corruption in a Borderless World, 1993, Proceedings of the Fifth International Anti-Corruption Conference; Vincenzo Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe, Offers that Can't be Refused, 1996; Ernesto Savona and Phil Williams(Eds.), The United nations and Trannational Organized Crime, Sieber, 18, 1996, pp.221; Ulrich sieber (Ed.), Internationale Organisierte, Kriminalitaet, Herausforderungen fuer ein Europa offener Grenzen, 1997; Mery M. Stolberg, Fighting Organized Crime, 1995,pp.33-54;Werner Railih,Das neue Mafia-Kartell. Wie die Syndikate den Osten erobern, 1994; Howerd Abansky, Organized Crime, 2nd Edition (1988) and 4th Edition (1994), pp.251-255; michael D. Lyman and Gary W. Potter, Organized Crime, 1997, pp.281; Claire Sterling, thieves eWorld, The Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime, 1994.


The Japanese National Police Agency has declared that through this international information network, the investigation department Of section of each country should exchange detailed information about organized crime groups and members- For- example, if a member of the Boryokudan likes to travel to foreign countries, the police should do everything in its power to check him up and list him at international airports. If necessary, this control or investigation agency should report his travel details to the appropriate agency of the destination country. 214

It is very difficult for the police in Japan to have such a system of international exchange of information. This is because in Japan certain people always like to defend tile human rights of the Boryokudan members in such cases.

But I think that the human rights of these illegal and violent groups should obviously be limited in such cases, because they themselves chose to belong to an illegal group. Unfortunately, although Japan is also a constitutional state, unlike the Penal Codes of some other countries, it has no special Violent Groups Control Act Penal codes of some other countries; it has no special Violent Groups Control Act (Anti-Boryokudan Law) against such organized crime groups.

Participation of citizens in movements to eradicate organized crime groups and offences

In Japan, some citizens have just begun to take initiatives to eradicate organized crime. In April 1990, I participated in a citizens' movement in Hiroshima in which some 600 people participated. I was impressed all the more by the fact that this first assembly was held in the international city of peace, Hiroshima. I was also shocked to find out that under the surface of this beautiful international city there is such a difficult social problem involving organized crime groups. It was here that I learned the three important slogans of this movement, namely

•  Don't fear the 'Bo-Ryo-Ku-Dan'(organized crime groups);
•  Don't use the 'Bo-Ryo-Ku-Dan'; and
•  Don't give money to the 'Bo-Ryo-Ku-Dan'.

In particular, I think that these three slogans could play the most important role in eradicating corruption among politicians and financiers in Japan. 215

214 White Police Paper, 1993.

215 H. Katoh, "Prohibition of Money Laundering as a Countermeasure against Organized Crime Groups (Yakuza or Boryokudan) in Japan", in Keio Law Review , No.7, 1994, pp.21-41; E. David Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza, The Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld, 1986, pp.241-269.


We should not laugh at these slogans or consider them simple and abstract-It is only through concentrated efforts and day to day activities like those carried out by this movement that we can slowly cut off old connections with such groups, and finally create a secure society without the 'Bo-Ryo-Ku-Dan'. And, of course, our government and criminal Justice agencies must assist us in this effort by positively supporting these citizen activities and movements.216

As I have already said, there is a negative trend regarding mass media coverage of organized crime groups in Japan. TV programs, newspapers and weekly magazines produce articles or report on violence and about the Boryokudan itself. These contribute towards and support the organized crime groups and therefore have a bad influence on Japan's young generation.

The people working for the mass media should become more socially responsible by actively taking part in and supporting citizens, activities, and they should campaign for the eradication of the so-called Boryokudan.

In fact, the Mafia, the Syndicate and the Boryokudan have attacked and murdered many important politicians and judges in Italy, USA, Colombia and other countries.217 Yet, unless we pluck up the courage to eradicate organized crime, our modern constitutional state and democratic political system will collapse and we w ill find ourselves once again in a in humane, lawless Middle Age type of society. We should not overlook this kind of injustice. We have to change our own culture, which accepts organized crime groups, and unlawful acts in general.

Lastly, I would like to say again that citizens, the Government and tile press should create a common strategy against Boryokudan-type crime groups, which represent a threat to democratic society.

216 Birgit Kienzele and Maria-Teresa Galluzzo, Frauen gegen die Mfia, 1990

217 Pino Arlacchi, Mafia von innen, Das Leben des Don Antonino Calderone, 1992; Giovanni Falcone (with Marcell Padovani, translated by Edward Farrell), Men of Honor, The Truth about the Mafia, 1992; Rene Seindal, mafia: Money and Politics in Sicily 1950-1997, 1998; Alexander Still, Excellent Cadavers, The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic, 1995.